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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, Case No. 20000520-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) (pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court plainly err or was defendant's trial counsel ineffective: 
(a) when the court, with counsel's approval, instructed the jury that "it is no defense 
to the prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or other 
consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous 
weapon was used" {Addendum B: Jury Instruction 13-Q; 
(b) when the court, in response to a jury question and at trial counsel's request, 
prepared a supplemental instruction to Instruction 13-C that clarified the phrase, "it is no 
defense to the prosecution," but did not define the terms "duel, mutual combat, or other 
consensual altercation;" or 
(c) when the court, without objection, did not provide the prepared supplemental 
instruction to the jury because, before the supplemental instruction could be given, the jury 
announced it had reached a verdict?1 
As defendant concedes, he failed to preserve these issues (Br.Aplt. at 2). Appellate 
review of the merits is precluded unless defendant now establishes that the trial court 
committed obvious and prejudicial error, or that his trial counsel's performance was deficient 
and prejudicial. State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 20, ^  18 & 40-41; State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, mi 19 & 31, 12 P.3d 92. Accord State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205,1 26, 29 P.3d 25 
(reaffirming requirement that unpreserved challenges to jury instructions are reviewed only 
for "manifest error"), cert, granted, 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 2001). Whether counsel is ineffective 
is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Visser, 2001 UT App 215, ^ 8, 31 P.3d 584, 
cert, denied, - P.3d - (Utah 2001). Whether a jury instruction is erroneous is a question of 
law. See State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, U 11, 6 P-3d 1116. 
2. Did procedural delays in defendant's direct appeal or omissions in the appellate 
record violate defendant's constitutional rights and result in actual prejudice justifying 
reversal of his conviction and barring his retrial? 
1
 Defendant's Points I and II attack Instruction 13-C and the omission of a 
supplemental instruction. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 1-3, 31-32. The State 
combines its response in a single point. 
2 
Again, this issue is not preserved and no standard of review applies. Whether a 
procedural delay or a record omission violate constitutional rights and result in actual 
prejudice is a question of law, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the individual 
case. Cf. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, HI 3-4 & n.3, 34 P.3d 790 (applying an 
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a dismissal of an information for a speedy trial 
violation, but recognizing the underlying issues of fact and law). See also Harris v. 
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of an 
inquiry into the reasons for appellate delay, even in jurisdictions where the length of the 
delay gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the appellate process was ineffective). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
For ease of reference, the State cites to the current version of any statute or rule unless 
the substance of the pertinent portion of the provision was amended since defendant's trial. 
Resolution of the appeal involves the following provisions, reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (1999) - Force in defense of person; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 (1999) - Consensual altercation no defense to 
homicide or assault if dangerous weapon used; 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17 - The Trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 
(A) The Jury Trial 
In 1992, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
2
 The procedural history of defendant's case is determinative of his due process 
claim; yet, defendant omits or mischaracterizes much of that history. See Br.Aplt. at 75-
23. Consequently, the State discusses the procedural facts in detail. 
3 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(a), (b), & (c) (1990), now UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(a), 
(b), & (c) (Supp. 2001), subject to a firearm penalty enhancement (R. 2, 17-18). 
J. Mac Arthur Wright, a Washington County Public Defender, was appointed to 
represent defendant (R. 3). Subsequently, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine if 
a conflict existed (R. 52-53). See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 859 (Utah 1992) 
(recognizing a disqualifying conflict if a part-time prosecutor also serves as a public 
defender). The court found that Mr. Wright had no actual conflict of interest since his only 
association with the prosecuting firm was that he owned the building in which the firm was 
located (id.). Defendant affirmatively waived any potential conflict and requested that Mr. 
Wright continue as his attorney (id.). 
Mr. Wright actively represented defendant at preliminary hearing, during pretrial 
hearings, and at trial (R. 15-16, 21-22, 33, 41-46, 54-67, 68, 70-85, 112-13). A private 
defense investigator was appointed and additional funds allocated for defense investigation, 
including funds for out-of-state travel and ballistic testing (R. 26, 37-39, 41-46). 
A jury trial occurred on December 15-18,1992 (R. 78-85). Mr. Wright called eleven 
witnesses, including defendant, to support defendant's claim that he shot the victim in self-
defense (R. 93-95). Nevertheless, the jury convicted defendant of murder (R. 114). 
During their deliberations, the jury requested "clarification" of Jury Instruction 13-C. 
See Addenda B & C: Instructions & Jury Notes. The trial court, with counsel's approval, 
told the jury they should "rely on the language of 13-C as it is written, and consider all the 
instructions as a whole" (id.; R. 1328-29). Later, the jury sent a second note that asked if the 
4 
phrase "[i]t is no defense to the prosecution" in Instruction 13-C meant it is "no help for the 
prosecution" (Addendum Q. Defense counsel "persuade[d] the Court that a clarifying and 
supplemental instruction should be given to the jurors, to clarify in their minds the meaning 
of that instruction" (R. 1363). See Addendum D: Order Supplementing Record. With the 
assistance of counsel, the court prepared a written supplemental instruction (R. I l l , 1363). 
But before the supplemental instruction could be given, the court and counsel were 
"informed by the Court Clerk that the jury had a verdict" (R. 1363). The parties and the 
judge then reassembled in the courtroom (R. 1329). The court asked if there was "anything 
before the Court prior to [the jury's] return," and defense counsel responded, "Nothing, Your 
Honor" (id.). The jury was returned to the courtroom and affirmed they had reached a 
verdict (R. 1330). Counsel did not request further instruction of the jury before the verdict 
was read (R. 1330, 1363-64). After the verdict was returned, the jurors were polled at 
counsel's request (R. 1330). The court then asked if there was "[a]nything further to come 
before the Court prior to the discharge of the jury;" defense counsel again responded, 
"Nothing, Your Honor" (R. 1331-32, 1363-64). 
After the jury was discharged, defendant asked to be sentenced immediately (R. 1333-
35).3 The court sentenced defendant to prison for the statutory indeterminate term of six-
- During sentencing, defense counsel voiced a "concern" about "some of the 
questions that the jury expressed to us. Questions that we were unable to respond to 
before the - before the jury came back;" however, he did not object to the lack of 
supplemental instruction or otherwise move to set aside the verdict or for a mistrial (R. 
1329-33, 1336, 1362-64). 
5 
years-to-life (R. 125-28,1472,1477-86).4 The judgment was entered on January 6,1993 (R. 
125-128). On January 22, 1993, Mr. Wright timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 134). 
Defendant's First Appeal, No. 931357-CA5 
Mr. Wright requested preparation of the trial record and transcripts (R. 1434). He 
then withdrew, apparently because defendant wished to challenge Mr. Wright's 
effectiveness, and arranged for Mark Miller's appointment as pew counsel (R. 264, 1434). 
Mr. Miller entered his appearance on February 10, 1993, and subsequently filed a 
docketing statement (R. 264). After reviewing the appellate record, Mr. Miller moved for 
remand to the trial court to permit supplementation of the appellate record with the 
unrecorded discussions concerning the supplemental instruction (R. 1442-44). 
Contemporaneously, defendant moved pro se to remove Mr. Miller as his attorney and for 
the appointment of new appellate counsel {Addendum F). On April 24, 1994, this Court 
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the pro se request for new 
4
 The original judgment imposed an erroneous term for the firearm enhancement; 
the judgment was subsequently amended to impose the correct six-year minimum term 
(R. 125-28, 1472, 1477-86). 
5
 The record on appeal contains a pro se motion, together with attachments of 
documents that are not otherwise included in the appellate record (R. 1409-52). 
Defendant has attached the same documents to his appellate brief. See Br.Aplt., 
Defendant's Addendum. The State references some of these documents as necessary to 
explain the procedural history. See, e.g., Addendum E: Fifth District Court Docket Sheet, 
No. 921500702. Additionally, the State relies on this Court's docket sheet in defendant's 
original direct appeal. See Addendum F: Docket Sheet, No. 931357-CA. Pursuant to rule 
201, Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court may take judicial notice of its own records and 
prior proceedings in the same case. Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). 
The State requests the Court do so. 
6 
counsel, and to permit creation of a supplemental record as requested by Mr. Miller (R. 
1437). Mr. Miller withdrew on May 12, 1994; he died approximately three weeks later (R. 
1438, 1440). 
On June 15,1994, the district court appointed Floyd Holm to represent defendant (R. 
1449). Mr. Holm completed the supplementation of the record (R. 1362-64). He also 
moved for remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which motion 
was denied (Addendum F). Mr. Holm was ordered to file defendant's brief by October 25, 
1995 (R. 1365). On October 19,1995, one week before the brief was due, defendant moved 
pro se for Mr. Holm's removal, despite Mr. Holm's warning to defendant that requesting new 
counsel would delay the appeal (R. 1387). The Court denied the pro se motion and ordered 
Mr. Holm to file the brief no later than January 10,1996 (Addendum F). On January 5,1996, 
five days before the brief was due, defendant again moved pro se to remove Mr. Holm (R. 
1373).6 This time, the Court remanded to the district court for consideration of the pro se 
motion (R. 1371). The district court removed Mr. Holm and appointed Thomas A. Blakely 
to represent defendant (R. 1394-96). 
6
 Defendant complained the county attorney handpicked Mr. Holm (R. 1422-25). 
The county attorney simply contracted with the Iron County public defender because 
defendant had exhausted the list of Washington County public defenders (Addendum E). 
Defendant also filed a bar complaint against Mr. Holm (R. 1366-68). Because the 
complaint was pending, Mr. Holm initially agreed a conflict existed (R. 1377-78). Once 
the complaint was resolved (Mr. Holm was directed to maintain better contact with 
defendant), the attorney felt he could continue as defendant's counsel (R. 1393). 
Defendant disagreed: he appealed the Bar's decision and insisted that Mr. Holm be 
removed (R. 1393). 
7 
On February 23, 1996, Mr. Blakeiy entered his appearance (Addendum F). Briefing 
was reset to June 7, 1996. Id. When no brief was filed, this Court dismissed the appeal on 
June 26, 1996 (R. 1399). Remittitur issued on August 12, 1996 (R. 1401). 
From August 12, 1996, to June 5, 2000, no appeal was pending in this case. 
Defendant's Post-Conviction Petitions 
Though Mr. Blakely's representation had terminated a year before, defendant filed 
a pro se motion on September 2, 1997, entitled "Motion to Withdraw Court Appointed 
Counsel, Thomas A. Blakeiy" (R. 1409-33). The pro se motion asked the district court to 
resentence defendant nunc pro tunc so he could appeal his conviction (id.). See State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). He complained that his prior appointed counsel were 
conflicted (R. 1411-13, 1420, 1426-28).7 He also alleged that Mr. Miller had failed to 
supplement the record and that significant portions of the record were missing (R. 1415, 
1421 -22).8 Despite defendant's frivolous allegations, he asserted one meritorious claim: Mr. 
7
 No conflicts existed. The trial court determined, at the time of Mr. Wright's 
appointment, that he had no disqualifying conflict (R. 52-53). Nor does the record 
support defendant's claim that Mr. Blakeiy "defrauded" him by allegedly accepting 
SI5.00 as a private retainer (R. 1426-27). There is no evidence that Mr. Blakeiy ever 
agreed to privately represent defendant or that defendant protested Mr. Blakeiy's 
appointment in 1996. 
8
 Mr. Holm supplemented the record (R. 1362-65). Nevertheless, defendant 
continues to claim the record is missing significant documents (Br.Aplt. at 16-17, 25, 47). 
The claim is without merit. In 1994, the district court entered an order supplementing the 
record (R. 1362-64). A court clerk later discovered that the 1994 order and 14 pages of 
miscellaneous documents were missing. The 1994 order has since been replaced through 
stipulation of counsel (Addendum D). The remaining missing documents are not 
determinative of the issues on appeal. See Order, No. 2000520-CA, dated 6/22/01. 
8 
Blakelv had failed to file an appellate brief, which failure resulted in the dismissal of 
defendant's appeal in Case No. 931357-CA (R. 1428-29). 
Defendant raised the same claim in a contemporaneous but separate civil post-
conviction petition (Addendum E). Odean Bowler, a Washington County public defender, 
was appointed to represent defendant in both proceedings (id.). On August 17, 1999, 
following an evidentiary hearing in the civil case, the district court granted defendant's post-
conviction petition and ordered defendant re-sentenced nunc pro tunc in the criminal case 
(R. 1459-62, 1472). On May 8, 2000, a nunc pro tunc judgment was entered that permitted 
Mr. Bowler to file a new notice of appeal on June 5, 2000 (R. 1482-86, 1488). 
Defendant's Current Appeal, No. 20000520-CA 
Mr. Bowler filed a docketing statement but then moved to withdraw since he was no 
longer the Washington County Public Defender (R. 1494). On October 26,2000, this Court 
remanded the case to the district court for appointment of new counsel (R. 1494). 
Defendant's current appellate counsel was appointed on January 17, 2001 (R. 1498). On 
November 28, 2001, appellant's brief was filed. 
9 
STATEMENT OF FACTS9 
It was 5:00 a.m., but defendant did not care: Larry Gilstrap, a neighbor in defendant's 
trailer park, was "fucking around with [defendant's] home boy's old lady" and defendant 
wanted to "talk" to him (R. 1182; see also R. 444-45, 530-31, 749, 855). Defendant sat in 
his living room with a loaded .22 pistol pointed at his head and told his friend Donald 
Turnbow to bring Larry to defendant's trailer or defendant would kill himself (R. 441-42, 
750-53, 755). When the pistol's ammunition clip fall out, Tumbow grabbed it (R. 756). 
Defendant boasted, "That ain't the only the gun I have," and reached for a nearby Thompson 
machine gun (R. 441-42,756). Defendant put the machine gun between his legs and pointed 
its barrel at his face (R.441 -42,757). With his thumb on the trigger, defendant told Tumbow 
to give him back the .22 clip or he would shoot (R. 757). Tumbow gave back the clip (R. 
758). Defendant still wanted someone to bring Larry to him (id.). 
Defendant's wife went to Larry's trailer (R. 856). Larry and another mutual friend, 
John Gourley, were there (R. 737, 840, 856). She told them defendant was "getting crazy, 
holding a gun to his head and stuff like that" (R. 856). Gourley cautioned Larry that if he 
went to defendant's, he better leave his gun in his truck because "everyone [was] pretty 
9
 Defendant does not directly challenge the evidence, but claims the jury 
instructions and appellate delays prejudiced him. See Br.Aplt. at 29-30, 44-45, 47. 
Resolution of these issues is necessarily fact-dependent; yet, defendant fails to marshal 
the evidence, impermissibly relying on his version of the facts. See Br.Aplt. at 4-15. See 
also State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^  17 & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. Consequently, the State 
restates the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, H 2. 
10 
drunk" (R.856).10 
Meanwhile, the violence at defendant's trailer escalated. Defendant retrieved a .357 
revolver from a cabinet and loaded it (R. 759). Defendant fired the .357 through his living 
room wall into his daughter's bedroom, shattering a picture hanging over her bed (R. 439-41, 
709-11, 760, 766, 952-54, 1172-73). Gourley was still at Larry's, but when he heard the 
shot, he ran back to defendant's trailer (R. 856-57). 
Larry drove up minutes later in his truck (R. 642, 661, 920). He was alone (R. 635, 
649-50, 655, 714). Despite defendant's earlier insistence that he just wanted to talk to 
Larry, defendant began muttering, "Somebody get the motherfucker out of here before I kill 
him" (R. 773). Defendant armed with his .357 and .22 walked up to Larry, who was 
standing outside his truck (R. 715-16, 773, 857-58, 923, 1181). The two moved about 15 
feet away from the truck (R. 426, 859-60, 924). Tumbow and Gourley could not see them 
in the darkness, but they could partially hear them (R. 659-61, 768-74, 923-29). So could 
several neighbors (R. 468-71,486,495-96, 501-05, 507,633-40,645-46,653-56, 661, 667, 
672-74). 
Defendant angrily told Larry to leave his friend's girlfriend alone (R. 861, 1182). 
10
 Gourley warned Larry because Gourley, like others, knew that Larry often 
carried a .22 (R. 803-05, 856). Gourley also knew that defendant was drunk and 
belligerent because he had been in a fistfight with him a few hours earlier and defendant 
had threatened to "blow [Gourley's] head off (R. 554-55, 742-44, 842-43, 845, 1167-
69). Larry knew about the prior threat, but also knew that defendant and Gourley had 
"hugged" and made up (R. 846, 849, 853, 919). 
11 
Larry replied, "Hey, man. It doesn't have to be this way. Come on, man" (R. 772, 862). 
Defendant fired in rapid succession, hitting Larry in the neck, chest, and back (R. 717, 771, 
862-64,874,902-05,911,1185-86,1225). Larry lay in the dirt, breathing heavily, his lungs 
audibly gurgling as they filled with blood (R. 655-56, 870). Defendant said, "Fuck. That 
wall show him" and "Somebody come and get this dumb son of a bitch" (R. 636, 655-56, 
668, 866-67). 
Defendant told Gourley to help him drag Larry to the truck or defendant would "shoot 
[his] ass too" (R. 871, 1186). Defendant's son also helped (R. 721-22, 1188). Someone 
wiped fingerprints off Larry's gun and placed it on the ground next to a large pool of blood 
where Larry had been shot (R. 972-74).n Gourley shouted out to the neighbors, "He's been 
shot. Call an ambulance" (R. 496, 774). Defendant and his son just walked away (R. 646, 
675). As they did, a neighbor heard defendant say, "It was a good place for an ambush" (R. 
675-76, 679). 
Defendant had Larry's blood on his clothes (R. 965-66). Instead of going to his own 
trailer just a few feet away, he went to the trailer-home of Rita Gilstrap's, Larry's estranged 
wife (R. 687, 722, 1189). He told her he "had just shot Larry, and that he was dead. That 
11
 Larry had a .22 in the truck when he went to defendant's, but only defendant 
claimed Larry had it outside the truck (R. 431, 437, 537, 884-86, 1185, 1204). The 
forensic evidence established that Larry's gun had been wiped clean of prints and placed 
on top of a pool of Larry's blood after he was shot (R. 972-74). The prosecutor argued 
that after the killing, defendant found the gun in its holster inside the truck and placed it 
near the pool of blood after wiping it clean of prints (R. 1276-77). Defendant admitted 
that he rummaged in the truck, but claimed he was only looking for the truck's keys (R. 
1187). 
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Larry had pulled a gun on him, and he'd shot him" (R. 688, 694). Defendant changed his 
clothes, hiding his bloody clothes between the mattresses of Rita's bed (R. 689,723,948-49, 
1190). Defendant still had both his guns. He told her that he had used the .357 to kill Larry 
and if she "talked to the police [she] would be next" (R. 691-92). As he left, defendant hid 
the .22 under Rita's front steps and the .357 under her garbage can (R. 442-43, 690, 1190-
92). 
Defendant then went to Tamara Howard's trailer (R. 480). He told her Larry was 
dead (R. 483). Tamara asked if defendant killed him (R. 484). Defendant responded, "Do 
you see any blood on me?" (id.). Tamara said no and defendant replied, "Well, then" (id.). 
Within 10 minutes of the shooting, the police arrived and discovered Larry's body in 
the truck (R. 402-06,520). Initially, the police thought Turnbow, who had had a run-in with 
Larry two weeks earlier, might be involved (R. 417, 523).12 After defendant changed his 
clothes and hid his guns, he casually walked back towards his trailer where the police were 
securing the scene (R. 407-08, 523). Defendant told them Turnbow was not involved, but 
gave no other information about the shooting (R. 408-09, 524, 725, 1193-94). 
A few minutes later, the police spoke to Turnbow and shifted their focus to defendant 
(R. 417-18). The police eventually found defendant hiding inside Tamara Howard's trailer 
and arrested him (R. 419-23, 488). 
12
 Days before, Larry and Turnbow had an argument during which Larry put his 
hand on his holstered gun (R. 819-20). Turnbow told Larry that if he "pull[ed] out the 
gun, [Turnbow] would knock [him] out" (R. 820). Larry did not pull out the gun (R. 829, 
831). Nevertheless, Turnbow reported the incident to the police (R. 821). 
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During his first police interview, defendant denied firing any weapon at Larry (R. 
533). He claimed that Larry and "a bunch of [unidentified] guys" had come to his trailer to 
"take care of business" (R. 530-31, 538). Defendant tried to speak to Larry about his 
"messing" with defendant's friend's girlfriend, but "the son of a bitch pulled a fucking gun 
on me and had four fucking people out there.... The motherfucker pulled a gun on me, and 
I wrestled with . . . As a matter of fact, I punched him, and that's exactly what 1 done. I 
punched that motherfucker, and he was going for his fucking gun, and that's - and that was 
that." (R. 585). Defendant never got "a chance to pull his gun out" (R. 537). He did not 
know who shot Larry, only that it was not him (R. 538). Defendant admitted he owned a .45 
revolver, but denied owning a .22 or .357 weapon (R. 538-40). 
A second police interview, the same day, was taped (R. 556). Confronted with his 
son's statement that defendant hid the .22 at Rita's, defendant admitted he placed the .22 
under her steps, but still denied it was his (R. 560-62). He then admitted that he had the .22 
with him when he confronted Larry, but claimed he "did not get a chance to even pull that 
gun out" (R. 564-65). Contrary to his first statement, he now admitted that a gun had been 
fired inside his house just prior to Larry's arrival, but denied he fired it and denied any 
knowledge of the bullet hole in his daughter's bedroom wall (R. 558-60). 
In describing the confrontation, he still claimed Larry hit him in the head with what 
he assumed to be a gun, but now admitted that he had "smacked" or "punched" Larry first 
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(R.565, 556-57).I3 According to defendant, "The next thing I know we are on the ground, 
and there was shooting going on. I don't know if he was shooting or I'm shooting or who 
was shooting, you know. And the rest of you guys out there, they - they were gone, and that 
was that" (R. 556-67). He insisted that if he did fire a gun, he did not know what gun he 
used, and suggested that Larry's unidentified friends may have accidently shot Larry while 
trying to shoot defendant (R. 564).14 Defendant was emphatic that Larry was still alive when 
defendant dragged him to the truck (R. 1186, 1226). He insisted that his intent in placing 
Larry in the truck was to take him to the hospital, but claimed he first needed to change his 
bloody clothes so that the police would not think he had shot Larry (R. 1186-88, 1227-29). 
The day after the murder, defendant was interviewed a third time; the interview was 
again taped (R. 549,552). The .357 had been recovered (R. 442-43,453).l5 Confronted with 
the discovery, defendant admitted that he fired the .357 inside his home and "thought" he 
13
 Defendant assumed it was a gun because Larry usually carried one: "All I seen 
was a black thing in his hand. I knew goddamn well it wasn't no water pistol, you know. 
I seen something black, and it was a gun. At least I thought it was a gun. All I seen was 
black, and that's all I know. And I ain't never seen Larry's gun at all" (R. 618). 
14
 Other witnesses, including defendant's son, testified that Larry was alone 
(R.635, 649-50, 655, 714, 824). 
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 When defendant's .357 was discovered, it had "one empty round, four spent 
cartridges and one cartridge that was still loaded with the primer indented," indicating 
that the gun may have misfired (R. 964-65). This was consistent with the description of 
the majority of the witnesses, who described hearing one shot (the shot inside the house) 
and then minutes later three shots in rapid succession (R. 468-70, 494-96, 501, 509-10, 
635, 638, 653-55,672-74, 717, 760, 771). Gourley testified that defendant may also have 
fired into the air before Larry arrived (R. 859, 862, 864, 874, 093-912; see also 1180-81). 
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might have fired it at Larry: 
[Interviewer]: Now, you did fire that .357 in your house; is that right? 
[Defendant]: Right. I did. 
Q:Why? 
A: Because I was thinking about shooting myself. You know, I'm not here to 
hurt nobody, you know. And I don't want to put my family - and I don't want 
to put my kids through no shit. Now, I already knew Larry pulled a gun on 
somebody,116] and I was going to - and I wasn't going out there without 
packing, okay? And when he went for the fucking gun, I smacked him. I got 
hit in the head, and I pulled my gun out, and I shot him. 
Q: Okay. Larry pulled his gun; you pulled yours and shot? Okay, yesterday, 
you didn't know. You grabbed his gun, shot him with it, or someone else shot 
him. So you're telling us -
A: Right. 
Q: You're telling us that you pulled your gun and physically shot him? 
A: I think I shot him. I don't know. I was drunk.ll7] 
Q: Okay. You just said that you shot him, but you just don't know how many 
times? 
A: Right. I said I shot him, and I was drunk, and I had to have shot him 
anyways. 
Q: But you don't remember how many times you pulled the trigger. 
A: No, I don't. 
A: We were wrestling when - when I think he got shot.[18] 
Q: The question is what exactly did Larry do with the gun that you remember 
after he pulled it out? 
A: He pulled it out, and I smacked him. 
Q: Okay. Then what did he do with the gun? 
16 The reference was to the Turnbow incident, see note 12, supra. 
17
 Defendant drank all night (R. 444-45, 556, 726). At trial, he maintained he 
could remember everything that occurred, but that his inebriation lead him to lie to the 
police (R. 1200-01, 1219, 1224-25, 1242). He did not claim his intoxication negated his 
intent, only that he acted in self-defense. Nevertheless, a voluntary intoxication 
instruction was given (R. 105). 
18
 Two witnesses thought they heard pushing or kicking during the argument, but 
the police found no evidence of a struggle (R. 463-64, 637-38, 654, 659). 
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A: He didn't get to do very much with the gun, because we was rolling around 
on the ground, and I pulled mine out, and I used mine first. 
Q: So he never did point it at you or anything, then? 
A: He tried pointing it at me as we were wrestling. And I rolled, and he did 
not shoot at me, but he did point it at me. And that's when I shot him with 
mine. 
Q: Where did he point it at you? What part of you? 
A: He pointed it I was guessing the chest, and that's when I rolled. 
(R. 566-69). 
By trial, defendant suggested that John Gourley accidently shot Larry (R. 1043, 
1047). Defendant claimed that Gourley or some other unidentified friend of Larry's fired 
the first shot, intending to hit defendant, but accidently hitting Larry (R. 1185, 1233). 
Defendant claimed he then fired two shots at Larry in self-defense while the two wrestled 
on the ground (R. 1186-1225, 1236). No evidence established that Gourley was armed or 
had fired the first shot (R. 917, 936-37, 1119-21, 1128). Indeed, the defense witness, who 
originally claimed Gourley confessed to him, admitted at trial that he made up the story to 
try to help defendant (R. 1105-08, 1112-15). 
The forensic evidence also undermined defendant's claim that the first shot was fired 
by someone else as defendant and Larry wrestled on the ground. The first gun shot was fired 
at close range, only 12-18 inches from Larry's neck (R. 1004, 1017, 1025). At the time, 
Larry's left arm was raised in a defensive posture (R. 1000). The bullet entered Larry's neck 
from the left front, followed a lateral path, and exited on the right side just above the 
collarbone (R. 998, 1005-06). It created a large hole in Larry's larynx, damaging his vocal 
cords and causing air to audibly escape as he tried to breath (R. 1002). While the wound was 
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fatal, death did not occur immediately; Larry was conscious for one to five more minutes (R. 
1003,1025, 1032-33). The recovered bullet fragment was not sufficient to conduct ballistic 
testing, but appeared to be consistent with a .357 (R. 436, 985, 986-87). 
According to witnesses, the second and third shots rapidly followed the first. See 
supra at 11-12. The second shot was fired from an indeterminate range, that is, not point 
blank range, while Larry's left arm was close to his chest (R.1007, 1009, 1017). It entered 
his left arm, above the elbow, and then entered his left chest just below the nipple (R. 1007-
08). The bullet fractured Larry's seventh rib, traveled through both lobes of the left lung, 
and lodged in Larry's backbone, where it was recovered and eventually matched to 
defendant's .357 (R. 979-82, 1008). The wound caused blood to enter Larry's chest, 
collapsing his left lung, and restricting the flow of blood to his heart (R. 1011). 
The third shot occurred after Larry fell to the ground and rolled over: Larry was 
probably lying flat on his stomach with his assailant standing over him and firing down (R. 
1016-17, \§12\ see also K. 862-63,905-06). The bullet entered Larry's lower back, traveled 
into his abdominal cavity, struck his left kidney, entered his abdomen, struck his spleen, 
perforated his diaphragm, entered his chest cavity, went through his left lower lung, exited 
his upper left lung lobe, deflected off his sixth rib, and reentered Larry's left upper lung lobe, 
where it was recovered and subsequently matched to defendant's .357 (R. 982-85, 1012). 
After this shot, death occurred quickly (R. 1014-15, 1032-33). 
The jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense and convicted him of murder (R. 
114). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jury Instructions: Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred and his trial 
counsel was ineffective (a) in instructing the jury on consensual altercation in Jury 
Instruction 13-C, (b) in not defining "duel, mutual combat, and consensual altercation" in a 
supplemental instruction to Instruction 13-C, and (c) in permitting the jury's verdict to be 
returned without giving a supplemental instruction. Defendant's arguments lack merit. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 (1999) limits a defendant's reliance on self-defense 
when a dangerous weapon is used during a consensual altercation which results in homicide. 
Here, defendant admitted that the encounter with the victim was consensual, that a firearm 
was used, and the victim died as a result. Instruction 13-C, which copied the statute verbatim 
was, therefore, proper. 
During deliberations, the jury twice requested clarification of Instruction 13-C. The 
first time, the court properly elected not to provide additional instruction to the jury. The 
second time, the court elected to provide a supplemental instruction. The ensuing 
supplemental instruction properly responded only to the question asked. It did not define 
"duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation" because no issue was raised concerning 
those common terms. Before the supplemental instruction could be given, however, the jury 
announced it had reached a verdict. The jury's announcement effectively negated their prior 
request for clarification of Instruction 13-C. Under these circumstances, no error occurred 
in accepting the verdict without providing a response to the jury's prior inquiry. 
Even if this Court found error in Instruction 13-C or in the return of the jury verdict, 
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any error would be harmless. Instruction 13-C, though correct, was incomplete. As written, 
Instruction 13-C overstated the available legal defenses. If the jury had been fully instructed 
on Utah law, they would have been informed that once a defendant uses a firearm in mutual 
combat, the defendant is precluded from claiming self-defense unless he "effectively 
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent 
to do so and the other person notwithstanding continues or threatens to continue the use of 
unlawful force." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(c) (1999). No version of the facts 
would support such a finding. Consequently, defendant suffered no prejudice from the 
instructions as given or from any lack of clarification prior to the verdict's return. 
Delay in Appeal and Omissions in Record: Defendant claims he has a Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy appeal, which was violated in this case. He also asserts that 
delays in his appeal and omissions in the record violate his right to due process. Defendant's 
argument is without merit. A criminal appeal must comport with due process, but neither the 
United States Supreme or Utah appellate courts recognize a Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy appeal. 
Here, every effort was made to accommodate defendant's repetitive demands for new 
counsel. One counsel was ineffective and caused defendant's original appeal to be 
dismissed. That error was cured when defendant was resentenced nunc pro tunc and his right 
to appeal reinstated. Likewise, an order was missing from the record on appeal, but has since 
been replaced; no other significant documents are missing. In sum, delay since defendant's 
conviction has been substantial, but his appellate process has been constitutional. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CLARIFICATION OF JURY INSTRUCTION 13-C WAS NOT 
MANDATED; THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO LEGAL 
REQUIREMENT TO GIVE A SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 
BEFORE THE JURY RETURNED THEIR VERDICT 
The jury was instructed pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 (1999), that: 
[i]t is no defense to the prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel, 
mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon was used. A firearm is a 
dangerous weapon. 
(R. 104; Instruction 13-C). See Addenda A & B: Statutes & Court's Instructions. On appeal, 
defendant challenges Instruction 13-C, claiming that a mutual combat/consensual altercation 
instruction should not have been given because "it could deprive one of the protection of 
self-defense" (Br.Aplt. at 28). Defendant also argues that Instruction 13-C was "confusing" 
because the terms "duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" were not defined 
(Br.Aplt. at 26-30). Because an instruction defining those terms was not given before the 
verdict was returned, defendant claims he was prejudiced and his conviction should be 
reversed (Br.Aplt. at 31-32). Defendant raises these unpreserved issues for the first time on 
appeal under the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to the 
preservation requirement (Br.Aplt. at 1-3).,9 See State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 20, ffljl 8 & 40-41; 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1 8, 12 P.3d 92 (both affirming plain error and ineffective 
19
 Point I of the State's brief responds to Points I and II of defendant's brief. 
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counsel as exceptions to the preservation rule). See also State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 
]j 26, 29 P.3d 25 (reaffirming that unpreserved challenges to jury instructions will only be 
reviewed for "manifest error"), cert, granted, 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 2001). 
Defendant's arguments maybe summarily rejected for lack of proper briefing. If their 
substance is considered, the arguments are without merit. 
(A) Defendant's Claims Are Not Adequately Briefed Nor the Evidence 
Properly Marshaled. 
This Court need not consider defendant's challenges to Instruction 13-C and to the 
return of the jury verdict because defendant has not complied with the briefing requirements 
of rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and has not marshaled the evidence to support 
his claim of prejudice. See State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) ("[a] 
well-briefed argument is most essential for an issue raised by an appellee for the first time 
on appeal because the new issue has not been addressed by the parties below and thus record 
support for the unaddressed argument is critical"). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that an appellate court is "not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"). 
In Point I of his brief, defendant cites authority for the axiom that reversible error may 
occur if a jury is not properly instructed. See BrAplt. at 28-30. At the same time, he 
concedes that the challenged jury instruction, Instruction 13-C, tracks verbatim the language 
of section 76-5-104. See BrAplt. at 28. Nevertheless, defendant muses: "One could 
wonder, is 76-5-104 unconstitutional?" (id.). Defendant does not further develop this 
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argument and does not otherwise present authority that Instruction 13-C is erroneous. 
Without such authority, his plain error and ineffective counsel arguments fail. See Pecht, 
2002 UT 20, HI 18 & 40-41; Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ffi[ 19 & 31 (affirming that plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel require an initial establishment of error). See also 
Casey, 2001 UT App 205,126 ("manifest error" requires establishment of substantial error). 
Defendant also impermissibly relies on New York law, while failing to acknowledge 
controlling Utah law. See Br.Aplt. at 26-27. Defendant fails to cite to rule 17(m), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which controls a criminal trial court's response to a jury 
inquiry. See Addendum A: Rule. See also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 
1985); State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459,460 (Utah 1984); State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1,3-4 (Utah 
App. 1993) (all recognizing applicability of rule 17(m) to criminal trials). And defendant 
fails to acknowledge Utah precedent addressing the appropriateness of mutual combat 
instructions in self-defense cases. See State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90-91 (Utah 1981) 
(recognizing appropriateness of a similarly worded mutual combat/consensual altercation 
instruction in a manslaughter prosecution where the defendant claimed he only armed 
himself in self-defense); State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977) (recognizing 
section 76-5-104's limitation on a defendant's claim of self-defense in a homicide 
prosecution); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560-61 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing 
appropriateness of a similarly worded mutual combat/consensual altercation instruction in 
a homicide prosecution where the defendant claimed she acted in self-defense in response 
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to the victim's initial aggressiveness), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555-56 (Utah App. 1991) (upholding use of identically worded 
mutual combat/consensual altercation instruction in a homicide prosecution involving almost 
identical facts to those currently on appeal). Defendant's failure to acknowledge this 
precedent is especially glaring because the trial court cited Sherard during the jury 
instruction conference (R. 1260-61 & 1263). Defendant's failure to properly cite controlling 
authorities allows this Court to summarily reject his arguments. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 1 13, 15 P.3d 1030 (recognizing party's duty to cite 
controlling case law adverse to its position). 
In Point II of his brief, defendant's lack of developed argument is flagrant. Presenting 
a variation of his first argument, defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to Instruction 13-C, in not seeking a supplemental instruction defining the 
consensual altercation, and in not moving for a mistrial when the jury verdict was returned 
without a response to the jury's prior request for clarification. See Br.Aplt. 31-32. Without 
further factual or legal argument, he then simply references his argument in Point I. See id. 
Moreover, defendant's claims are dependent upon a showing of prejudice. SeePecht, 
2002 UT 20,11 18 & 40-41; Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 19 & 31; Casey, 2001 UT App 
205,126. Yet, defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and fails to 
establish that, but for the alleged errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different. 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 17 & n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (setting forth marshaling standard 
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and requirement). Instead, defendant simply speculates that he suffered prejudice because 
the jury may have been confused. See Br.Aplt. at 27-28& 30 & 32. To the degree defendant 
recites the evidence (Br.Aplt. at 4-15), he does nothing more than restate his own version of 
the evidence, a version rejected by the jury (e.g., Br.Aplt. at 9-10 ("according to Frausto "), 
at 11 ("Frausto reveals"), at 12 ("Frausto denies"), at 12-13 ("Frausto believes"). See 
Gamblin, id. (recognizing impermissibility of simply rearguing facts rejected by the fact-
finder). Defendant's failures justify summary rejection of his challenges. See id.; Bishop, 
753 P.2d at 450. Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, defendant's challenges are 
meritless. 
(B) Jury Instruction 13-C Is a Correct Statement of the Law. 
'To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists, (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" Pecht, 
2002 UT 20, f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). Accord 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  31. Likewise, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, "an 
appellant must show that trial counsel 'rendered deficient performance which fell below an 
objective standard of professional judgment,' and that the deficiency was ultimately 
prejudicial." Pecht, 2002 UT 20, f 41 (quoting State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998). "A defendant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
'the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. (quoting State 
v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ^ 10,4 P.3d 778). Accord Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119. Thus, to 
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succeed, defendant must first establish that Instruction 13-C is erroneous. This he cannot do. 
The issue before the jury was self-defense, that is, was defendant's use of deadly 
force objectively reasonable? See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (1999) (setting out 
requirements for claiming self-defense) (Addendum A). See also State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211, 216 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that under Utah law, a defendant's acts may not go 
"beyond what was reasonably necessary to defend himself); $herard, 818 P.2d at 560-61 
(reaffirming that objective standard governs self-defense). The trial court correctly instructed 
the jury that defendant had no burden to prove he acted his self-defense; rather, the 
prosecution had the "burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in 
self-defense" (R.106). See Addendum B: Jury Instruction 13-E. The jury was properly 
instructed that a person may only reasonably use force against "another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend himself against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force," and may only use deadly force "if he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious injury to himself (id.). 
Finally, the jury was properly instructed that in judging the reasonableness of defendant's 
actions, an objective standard applied, that is, "the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
the then existing circumstances" (id.). Defendant does not take issue with Instruction 13-E, 
the self-defense instruction. 
Defendant's complaint is with Instruction 13-C, the mutual combat/consensual 
altercation instruction. For text of instruction, see supra at 21 & Addendum B. Defendant 
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claims that Instruction 13-C was inappropriate because it unduly limited his reliance on self-
defense and further claims that because the instruction did not define what constitutes a 
"duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation," the instruction was confusing. Utah 
precedent and statutory law does not support defendant's arguments. 
Instruction 13-C tracks verbatim section 76-5-104. See Addenda A & B. A jury 
instruction which relies on statutory language is not erroneous "if the jury is not likely to be 
confused or misled." Starks, 627 P.2d at 90 (other citations omitted). Here, the statutory 
phrase "it is no defense to the prosecution" and the statutory terms "duel, mutual combat, or 
consensual alteration" were neither misleading nor confusing. Indeed, the terminology has 
been used by Utah courts for years. See, e.g., Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214 (describing self-
defense is a "defense to prosecution"); Sherard, 818 P.2d at 561 (approving instruction 
which used the term "mutual combat, or other consensual altercation" to describe the 
statutory limitation placed on claims of self-defense); Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 (concluding 
that an instruction identical to Instruction 13-C did not mislead the jury). On its face, 
Instruction 13-C was not erroneous.20 
Moreover, terms of common usage need not be defined in an instruction unless the 
20
 The State does not respond to defendant's undeveloped argument that section 
76-5-104 is unconstitutional (Br.Aplt. at 28), especially in light of substantial Utah 
precedent recognizing that a claim of self-defense is statutorily limited. 
Additionally, defendant's unsupported assertion that Instruction 13-C shifted the 
burden of proof to defendant, ignores Instruction 13-E's explicit admonition that the State 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See 
Br.Aplt. at 29 and State's Addendum B. 
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jury specifically requests clarification. See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1981) 
(recognizing that, as a general rule, it is "unnecessary and undesirable for a trial judge to 
volunteer definitions of terms of common usage for the jury").21 Here, the jury only sought 
clarification of the phrase, "it is not a defense to the prosecution" {Addendum C). The jury 
never requested a definition of "duel, mutual combat and consensual altercation." Therefore, 
defendant's claim that the court plainly erred or counsel was ineffective for not defining 
these common terms is specious. 
Similarly, defendant's argument that Instruction 13-C unfairly limited his reliance on 
self-defense is without legal support {Br.Aplt. at 28). 
The general rule is that one who slays another, to be justified or excused on 
the ground of self-defense, must be without fault in provoking the difficulty. 
One who, as an aggressor, provokes an attack upon himself, brings on or 
encourages a difficulty or quarrel with the deceased, or produces the occasion 
which makes it necessary for him to take life, cannot assert that he acted in 
self-defense and thus excuse or justify the homicide he has committed. A 
person who, by provocative behavior, initiates a confrontation, even with no 
intention of killing other [sic] person, cannot assert a claim of self-defense. 
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 Defendant argues that Couch and State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313 (Utah App. 
1993), mandate the giving of definitional instructions {Br.Aplt. at 28-31). Defendant is 
incorrect. Both cases state only that courts "should" respond to a jury's explicit request 
for clarification of a critical term. See Couch, 635 P.2d at 95; Souza, 846 P.2d at 1320-
21. In responding, however, the trial court may simply provide a dictionary. Souza, 846 
P.2dat 1321. Accord UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(m) (a criminal trial judge retains the 
discretion to decide when further instruction is necessary). Ultimately, the issue is not so 
much whether the trial court responded, but whether the instructions as a whole were 
adequate. Cf. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998) (erroneously citing 
rule 47(n), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing court's responses to inquiries in 
civil cases, but nevertheless holding the trial court's failure to respond to a jury inquiry 
harmless). 
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40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 148 (1999). Utah law has likewise long recognized that a 
defendant who uses a firearm when engaging in a consensual altercation does so at his own 
risk. If the consensual altercation results in a homicide, self-defense may not be used to 
justify the killing unless (1) the defendant communicated an intent to withdraw from the 
consensual altercation, (2) the defendant in fact withdrew from the fight, and (3) the 
deceased nevertheless continued to use unlawful force. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(2)(c) 
(Addendum A). See Starks, 627 P.2d at 90-91 (affirming jury's rejection of Starks' self-
defense claim and noting that Starks had the right to arm himself in confronting the victim, 
who had violent propensities, but "defendant's verbal and physical acts at the scene of the 
homicide were sufficient to justify a instruction [based on Utah's self-defense and 
consensual altercation provisions] that if the defendant were found to be the aggressor he 
could not rely on the defense of self-defense"); Gibson, 565 P.2d at 786 (affirming jury's 
rejection of Gibson's claim that he only stabbed the victim after the victim pulled a knife on 
him as they wrestled and holding that "[e]ven if it should be accepted that the provocation 
resulted in mutual combat, there is no indication that the defendant desired to withdraw nor 
that he so indicated to the deceased''); Sherard, 818 P.2d at 560-61 (affirming jury's 
rejection of Sherard's claim that the victim was the initial aggressor and holding that even 
if the victim had "mutually agreed to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard's use of a 
deadly weapon in that fight . . . even if [the victim] is viewed as the initial aggressor"); 
Pascual, 804 P.2d at 555-56 (recognizing that under Utah law, "the use of force of any kind 
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is not justified if the person claiming [self] defense was the aggressor or was engaged in a 
combat by agreement"). 
Significantly, Instruction 13-C, though correct, was a not complete statement of Utah 
law. Even when read with Instruction 13-E, Instruction 13-C did not explain that a defendant 
must withdraw from a mutual combat before he may claim self-defense. Compare UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-104 and Instructions 13-C & 13-E, with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(1) 
& (2)(c). See also Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 (holding that instruction identical to Instruction 
13-C was an incomplete statement of Utah law because the instruction only limited the use 
of deadly force, whereas Utah self-defense law actually prohibits the use of any unjustified 
force). Thus, as written, Instruction 13-C "overstated the available defenses." See id. 
(applying same characterization to instruction identical to Instruction 13-C). Defendant 
cannot complain that the trial court plainly erred or his counsel was ineffective for providing 
him with more than the law allowed. See id. (holding that use of identically worded 
instruction was harmless in that it provided a greater benefit to defendant than what he was 
entitled under Utah law). See also State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989); and State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987) (all refusing to review jury instruction where defendant did not object to 
instruction as given or offer an alternative instruction). 
(C) Because Instruction 13-C Correctly Stated the Law, No Supplemental 
Instruction Was Mandated. 
In this case, the jury made two inquiries concerning Jury Instruction 13-C. In 
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response to the first note, the court, with counsel's approval, told the jury to rely on the plain 
language of 13-C and to read the instructions as a whole (R. 1328-29 & Addendum C). On 
appeal, defendant does not challenge the court's handling of the initial inquiry. 
Subsequently, the jury asked if the phrase "it is no defense to the prosecution" meant that it 
was "no help to the prosecution" (id.). Defendant's trial counsel persuaded the court to give 
a supplemental instruction (R. 1362-64). A proposed instruction was drafted, which read: 
It is the law, as stated in Instruction No. 13-C, that dueling, mutual combat, or 
a consensual altercation shall be no defense to a criminal charge of Murder, 
if the accused employed a dangerous weapon in causing the death of another 
during a duel, mutual combat or consensual altercation. However, you are 
also instructed that in this case, you must consider whether or not the 
Defendant was justified in the use of deadly force under the law of self-
defense as set forth in Instruction No. 13-E. 
(R. 111). After the instruction was prepared, but before it could be read to the jury, the jury 
announced it had reached a verdict (R. 1362-64). The court asked if counsel had "anything" 
before the verdict was returned; defense counsel responded in the negative (R.1329). The 
verdict was then read (R. 1330, 1363-64). Before the jury was excused, the court again 
asked counsel if he had any motions and he again stated he did not (R. 1331-32, 1363-64). 
See Statement of the Case, supra at 4-5. 
A criminal trial judge has more discretion in responding to a jury's inquiry than a civil 
trial judge. When a jury seeks clarification of a point of law during deliberations in a civil 
trial, the jury may insist that they be returned to the courtroom where "the information 
required must be given." See UTAH R. CIVIL P. 47(n) (emphasis added) (Addendum A). In 
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contrast, when a jury seeks clarification in a criminal trial: 
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court, where, in 
the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(m) (emphasis added) {Addendum A). See Kozik, 688 P.2d at 460 
(recognizing discretion granted to trial court judge by rule 17(m); Lucero, 866 P.2d at 3-4 
(same). But see Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1230 (erroneously citing only to the civil rule, but 
nevertheless finding criminal court's failure to respond to jury inquiry harmless). 
Here, the court fully complied with the criminal rule. In response to the first note, the 
court effectively advised the jury that further instruction would not be given. The second 
time, the court and counsel prepared a supplemental instruction, which used slightly different 
language to convey the substantive equivalent of the court's prior instructions. While 
defendant now takes exception to the supplemental instruction as drafted, see Subsection 
1(B), supra, the legal correctness of the proposed instruction is not at issue because the 
instruction was never given. Instead, the issue is whether the court plainly erred or counsel 
was ineffective when they concluded that the jury no longer sought clarification of 
Instruction 13-C once they reached a verdict. 
Rule 17(m) requires a court to respond in some manner to a jury inquiry, but only to 
the degree that a jury question is pending before it. Here, the jury implicitly withdrew their 
prior request for clarification when they informed the court they had reached a verdict. 
Additionally, defendant implicitly agreed that further instructions were unnecessary when 
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he did not object to the verdict's return. This was not surprising, since the instructions as 
given and any confusion expressed by the jury benefitted defendant. See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76,^ 1 i\\ State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991) (both recognizing that 
a court does not commit plain error by respecting counsel's strategic choices). Given these 
circumstances, it was reasonable for the court to assume that both the jury and defendant 
waived their prior requests for clarification. 
(D) In Any Case, Defendant Has Not Established Prejudice. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in receiving the verdict without 
informing the jury that it was prepared to respond to their question, the error is not 
prejudicial. As previously discussed, the meaning of mutual combat and consensual 
altercation were not at issue and thus, no definition was required of those terms. At best, 
rule 17(m) simply required a response to the question posed, i.e. what did "it is no defense 
to the prosecution mean."22 The proposed supplemental instruction answered this question 
by explaining that the phrase meant "it is not defense to a charge of murder" (R. 111). Thus, 
if the proposed instruction had been given, it would not have benefitted defendant. See 
Pascual, 804 P.2d at 556 and Subsection 1(B), supra at 30. 
In sum, defendant was not entitled to the supplemental instruction he now proposes. 
22
 The State does not concede that the court was required to provide a 
supplemental instruction. Pursuant to rule 17(m), the court could refuse further 
instruction as it did the first time. But to the extent that a substantive response is 
encouraged, the proposed supplemental instruction was sufficient. See Porter, 705 P.2d 
at 1176-77; Lucero, 866 P.2d at 4 (holding alleged rule 17(m) error harmless where 
instructions were not erroneous). 
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At best, he was entitled to the supplemental instruction prepared below - an instruction 
which simply clarified that defendant was not entitled to claim self-defense if he used a 
firearm in a mutual combat. Because the drafted instruction would not have benefitted 
defendant, he suffered no prejudice from its omission. 
POINT II 
UTAH RECOGNIZES NO SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A 
SPEEDY APPEAL; TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANT PRESENTS A 
DUE PROCESS CLAIM, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL MEETS THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
Relying on Harrisv. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994), defendant asserts that 
he has been deprived of a purported right to a speedy appeal because his direct appeal has 
been pending for nine years {BrAplt. at 56-47). Defendant presumes that Harris creates a 
constitutional right that this Court must recognize and enforce. However, the United States 
Supreme Court and Utah appellate courts have never recognized a Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy appeal. Even if such a right existed, defendant has not demonstrated its violation 
in this case or sought a legally and factually supported remedy. Moreover, to the extent 
defendant presents a due process claim, the appellate process in this case meets the 
constitutional standard. 
Certainly, an extraordinary length of time has elapsed since defendant's conviction 
in December 1992. But contrary to defendant's claim, the reasons for that delay have little 
to do with the State. Instead, the majority of the delays are directly attributable to 
defendant's repetitive requests for new counsel. See Statement of the Case, supra at 6-8. 
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Additionally, for a substantial portion of that time - from August 1996 to June 2000 - no 
direct appeal was pending. Defendant's current appeal, Case No. 2000520-CA, has only 
been pending since June 5,2000. See id. at 9. Consequently, while nine years have elapsed 
since defendant's conviction, the time relevant to a speedy appeal or due process claim is, 
at defendant's best, less than five years, and by the State's calculations, less than two years. 
In any case, defendant's arguments may be summarily rejected for lack of proper 
briefing. If their substance is considered, the arguments are without merit.23 
(A) Defendant's Claims Are Not Adequately Briefed Nor the Evidence 
Properly Marshaled. 
Defendant has not complied with this Court's briefing and marshaling requirements 
and, therefore, the Court may summarily refuse to consider the merits of defendant's claims. 
See Point 1(A), supra, for briefing and marshaling requirements. 
Defendant presents his speedy appeal and due process claims by quoting massive 
passages from non-controlling case law. See Br.Aplt. at 32-40, 43-47. To the extent he 
cites controlling authority, the references are contained in quotations and presented without 
argument or analysis. See Br.Aplt. at 36, 39, & 45. Defendant is not entitled to make this 
Court a "depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450. 
23
 Defendant additionally claims that omissions in the appellate record violate his 
right to due process (Br.Aplt. at 24-25\ 49). This argument is frivolous. As previously 
explained, the only significant missing document, the 1994 Order Supplementing Record, 
has been replaced. See Addendum D. The remaining missing documents are 
insignificant. See note 8, supra at 8. 
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Additionally, defendant's claims of unconstitutional delay are fact-dependent. Yet, 
defendant recites only those facts he finds favorable, while failing to acknowledge the 
substantial facts which undermine his argument. Compare State ys Statement of the Case, 
with Br.Aplt. at 3-4, 36, 40-42 & 44. Defendant's failure to fairly present the procedural 
history precludes consideration of the merits of his claims. Cf. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 17 
& n.2. Alternatively, defendant's arguments fail on their merits. 
(B) No Controlling Authority Recognizes a Right to a Speedy Appeal and 
Defendant Presents No Reason to Craft Such a Right in This Case. 
Relying solely on authority from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, defendant 
asserts that the "State" (the public defenders and courts) have deprived defendant of his right 
to a speedy appeal and, therefore, he is entitled not only to reversal of his conviction but also 
a bar to a retrial (Br.Aplt. at 44-45 & 49). 
This Court is not bound to follow federal circuit court case law. Controlling law is 
determined by the Utah appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court, neither of 
which have recognized a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy appeal. Indeed, the Sixth 
Amendment does not compel states to grant a right to appeal from a criminal conviction, 
much less a speedy appeal. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Nevertheless, 
if an appeal right is granted, it must comport with rudimentary due process. Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387,393(1985). 
To succeed on his Sixth Amendment claim, defendant must demonstrate why this 
Court should recognize a right not previously recognized by any Utah appellate court or 
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imposed on the states by the federal supreme court. Defendant fails to make any such 
argument. As discussed in Subsection 11(A), supra, that failure independently defeats his 
claim. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 489 ("nominally" referring to state constitutional arguments 
is insufficient to consider them on their merits); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (refusing to consider state constitutional claim presented without supporting 
legal analysis or authority). 
In addition, the procedural posture of this case presents no reason to address whether 
a speedy appeal right exists because finalizing the present appeal will vindicate the purported 
right. In contrast to the instant appeal, Harris addressed state convicts' collateral claims that 
they were deprived of their right to appeal by the systematic breakdown of the Oklahoma 
appellate system. 15 F.3d at 1548-49. Harris's recognition of a Sixth Amendment speedy 
appeal right was the mechanism by which the federal court could excuse the petitioners' 
procedural failure to exhaust their state remedies before seeking the federal writ. 15 P.3d 
at 1554-57. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the appropriate remedy for an 
unconstitutionally delayed appeal generally is a court order coercing the delaying court into 
action, that is, a conditional federal writ ordering a petitioner's release unless the state court 
completes the petitioner's appeal within a specified time. Id. at 1566-67. At the same time, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded that petitioners whose convictions had been affirmed by the state 
courts were entitled to no relief because the affirmance established that they had been held 
under a valid judgment the entire time. Id. at 1566. Unconditional release - reversal and 
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release without retrial - was only justified if a state petitioner demonstrated credible grounds 
for reversal and established that the appellate delay actually impaired the petitioner's 
grounds for reversal or his defenses if retried. Id. at 1563-64. 
Here, defendant has established no //arm-like situation. Only one of defendant's 
appointed counsel, Thomas Blakely, failed to do a required act. That defect was cured when 
defendant was resentenced nunc pro tunc and his right to appeal reinstated. Cf. Harris, 15 
F.3d at 1547 (recognizing that Sixth Amendment defect is cured once omission is rectified). 
But apart from Mr. Blakely, defendant has established no individual ineffectiveness or 
systemic breakdown in connection with his other appellate attorneys. And without a 
showing of a systemic breakdown or widespread individual ineffectiveness, defendant does 
not even fall within Harris's recognition that a substantial delay may give rise to a rebuttable 
presumption of a Sixth Amendment violation.24 See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1555-56. 
Even if this Court were to recognize a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy appeal, 
defendant has not established that the right was violated here, or even if violated, that the 
violation has not been remedied. Whatever individual delays defendant claims, those delays 
are not representative of a systemic breakdown of the appellate process and, in any case, 
24
 Under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1556, a period of appellate delay in excess of two 
years from the notice of appeal would create a rebuttable presumption that the state 
appellate system was not "effective" and, therefore, violative of the Sixth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the two-year period was not a bright line 
rule. Id. The court determined the presumption applicable based on its prior judicial 
determination that the entire Oklahoma appellate system was in "crisis." Id. at 1550 & 
1556. 
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have been remedied by the filing of defendant's brief. Cf Harris, 15 F.3d at 1547. And 
because defendant has failed to establish that reversal error occurred in his trial see Point 
I supra, the length of any delay which proceeded the filing of defendant's non-meritorious 
brief is irrelevant. See Campiti v. Commonwealth, 687 N.E.2d 268, 269 (Mass. 1997) 
(recognizing that "it would be strange indeed if we said that delay in processing the 
defendant's nonmeritorious appeal warrants reversal of his conviction") (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). For Sixth Amendment purposes, his appeal was not ineffective, 
just unsuccessful. Cf. State v. Julian,11 \ P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1989) (citingMedina, 738 
P.2d at 1024, for proposition that a defendant cannot complain his defense was ineffective 
merely because it was unsuccessful). 
(C) To the Extent Defendant Claims a Due Process Violation, The Appellate 
Process in This Case Meets the Constitutional Standard. 
Apart from the Sixth Amendment, Harris also recognized that inordinate appellate 
delay may establish an independent due process violation. 15 F.3d at 1557-65. To the extent 
defendant claims a due process violation, the appellate process in this case meets the 
constitutional standard. 
Harris recognized that unlike the two-year presumption used to excuse procedural 
exhaustion under a Sixth Amendment claim, the length of appellate delay is but one factor 
to be considered for due process analysis. 15 F.3d at 1560 n. 10. By itself, excessive delay 
does not determine the ultimate constitutional issue. Id, Accord Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 
F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir.) (finding thirteen-year appellate delay was harmless), cert, denied, 
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506 U.S. 1024 (1992). Instead, relying on speedy trial analysis set out in Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 53 0 (1972), the Tenth Circuit looked to four factors in determining if the delay 
in Harris' case violated due process. Those factors were: (1) the length of appellate delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay and whether the reason is justified; (3) whether the defendant 
asserted a desire for a timely appeal; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant, in 
the sense that it caused him oppressive incarceration, constitutionally cognizable anxiety and 
concern, and impaired his grounds for appeal or his ability to defend on retrial. Harris, 15 
F.3d at 1558-59. Application of those factors to the present case establishes that defendant 
has been accorded all due process to which he is entitled.25 
In addressing the length of delay, defendant lumps together all time periods since his 
conviction. See Br.Aplt. at 36. This is improper. Whatever defects occurred in defendant's 
first appeal, Case No. 931357-CA, those defects were cured when defendant elected to be 
resentenced nunc pro tunc and allowed to seek a new appeal. Thus, the proper period to 
consider begins with the filing of the notice of appeal in this appeal, that is, June 5, 2000. 
The elapsed time from notice to the filing of defendant's brief is approximately eighteen 
months. Even under Harris, an 1 Vi year delay is acceptable. Id. at 1562. Thus, the length 
2:>
 The State does not concede that Barker speedy trial analysis is necessarily the 
appropriate framework for analyzing a due process claim of appellate delay. See Cody v. 
Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting "obvious differences" between 
the rights to a speedy trial and a speedy appeal and consequently holding that "Barker 
criteria must be applied differently in analyzing the constitutional significance of 
appellate, as opposed to trial, delay"). The State merely assumes Barker's applicability 
for purposes of argument. 
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of time is not inordinate. 
If, however, the delays from the first appeal are combined with the present appeal, a 
more substantial period of delay has occurred, though again, not the nine years claimed by 
defendant. Appellate delay necessarily requires an appeal to be pending. From August 8, 
1996, to June 5, 2000, no appeal was pending in this case. See supra at 8. Combining the 
two appeals but excising the time when no appeal was pending, the length of delay would 
equal approximately five years. The State does not dispute that five years is inordinate for 
an appeal of this nature. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562 (recognizing that a complex case may 
warrant additional appellate delay). Nevertheless, when the other factors are considered, no 
constitutional violation is established. 
Under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562, once inordinate delay is established, a lower burden 
of proof is allowed for the other Barker factors. Assuming arguendo that in this case, the 
period of appellate delay is determined to be inordinate and a lower burden of proof applies, 
defendant still cannot establish a due process violation. 
The second factor is the reason for the delay. Under traditional analysis, a court must 
always consider the reasons for the delay, including who precipitated the delay. See State 
v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 53,^6 (recognizing that any delays caused by defendant toll the 
applicable time period under the detainer statute); State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, [^j 
6 & 8, 34 P.3d 790 (recognizing that delays caused by defendant's motions are excluded 
from speedy trial calculations); State v. Trafney, 799 P.2d 704, 707-08 (Utah 1990) (same). 
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In Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562, the court attributed all delays to the government based on the 
Tenth Circuit's prior determination of systemic chaos in Oklahoma's indigent defendant 
process. Here, no such systemic problem exists. The reasons for the delays, therefore, must 
be individually examined and individually attributed. 
But for Mr. Blakely, defendant's attorneys all appeared to be working diligently on 
his appeal. Mr. Wright filed a notice of appeal and a request for transcript before arranging 
for the timely substitution of Mr. Miller pursuant to their contractual obligations as public 
defenders. See Statement of the Case, supra at 6-7. Mr. Miller filed a docketing statement, 
reviewed the substantial record, and then properly determined that additional 
supplementation of the record was necessary (id.). But before he could complete the 
supplementation, defendant insisted that he be removed (id.). The trial court never 
considered the merits of defendant's motion because Mr. Miller died. Mr. Holm was then 
appointed. He completed the record supplementation, moved for a rule 23B remand, and 
presumptively was working diligently to complete the brief when defendant moved for his 
removal. See supra at 7. Mr. Holm warned defendant that if he insisted on a new attorney, 
defendant's appellate process would be delayed (R. 1387). Defendant proceeded anyway, 
twice insisting one week before the brief was due that new counsel be appointed. See supra 
at 7. Faced with defendant's continued opposition to Mr. Holm, the trial court ultimately 
provided new counsel (id.). Up to this point, delays in the appeal are attributable to 
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defendant. Those delays total at minimum seventeen months/6 
Mr. Blakely was then appointed to represent defendant. The trial court ultimately-
found Mr. Blakely to be ineffective and granted defendant's request to be resentenced nunc 
pro tunc. For purposes of argument, the period that Mr. Blakely represented defendant, a 
period of approximately four months, will be attributed to the State. See Statement of the 
Case, supra at 8. 
Following dismissal of Case No. 931357-CA, no appeal was pending for the next four 
years. The appellate time period began to run again on June 5, 2000, the date the notice of 
appeal was filed in this case, Case No. 20000520-CA. And while present defense counsel 
faced a contempt order before filing defendant's brief, it appears that counsel did not lack 
diligence in preparing defendant's brief, only knowledge of how to properly seek an 
enlargement of time in which to file it. See Order to Show Cause, Case No. 20000520-CA, 
dated 11/15/01 and Motion to Strike Order to Show Cause, dated 11/27/01. In any case, 
even under Harris, 15 F.3d at 1547, this Court's acceptance of defendant's brief cured any 
procedural deficiency and, therefore, defendant has suffered no prejudice. 
In sum, defendant can establish, at best, that four months of an approximate five year 
delay are attributable to the State. In contrast, defendant is responsible for at least seventeen 
months of delay. The remaining periods of delay represent time periods reasonably 
26
 The seventeen months represents only the time periods between the filing and 
disposition of defendant's pro se motions to remove counsel. However, every 
substitution of counsel resulted in additional delays as each new attorney assigned "came 
up to speed." 
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necessary for each of defendant's new counsel to reasonably review the 1500-page record, 
conduct research, and begin preparation of the brief. Indeed, the record supports that but for 
defendant's pro se motions, Mr. Holm would have filed defendant's brief on January 10, 
1996 (Addendum F). The primary reason it was not was defendant. See People v. Holt, 937 
P.2d 213, 271 (Calif.) (rejecting Harris v. Champion approach and holding that appellate 
delay was reasonably related to courts' efforts to secure competent counsel for defendant in 
capital case), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1017 (1997). 
The third factor, whether defendant requested a speedy appeal, can be summarily 
considered. The State does not dispute that defendant stated that he wanted his appeal to 
progress. But defendant's actions negated his words. Defendant knew that each time he 
requested new counsel, his appeal would be delayed. Yet, he persisted. 
The fourth factor is really the most significant, for without actual prejudice, the due 
process violation is harmless. See Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1170 n.7 (3rd Cir.) 
(concluding that, based on the specific facts of the case, the best remedy for the speedy 
appeal violation was to grant a new trial, but recognizing that if the petitioner "had received 
an adequate and effective, through excessively delayed appeal, then the issue of prejudice 
would become more difficult"), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 905 (1995); Harris, 15 F.3d at 1564-
66 (recognizing that to be prejudicial, appellate delay must substantially impact the fairness 
of the appellate process or substantially impair the ability to present a defense upon retrial); 
Muwwakkil, 968 F.2d at 285 (same). Here, defendant has not established even a colorable 
44 
claim of prejudice. He establishes no meritorious issue on appeal. See Point I supra. 
Therefore, the nine years he has been held is warranted. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1566; 
Campiti, 687 N.E.2d at 269. And even if he demonstrated reversible error, he has not 
established any constitutional justification to bar retrial. Cody, 936 F.2d at 722 (recognizing 
that even when a due process violation is found, reversal and unconditional release would 
only be appropriate if the delay "so tainted the appellate process as to affect the 
constitutional integrity of the appeal itself) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Merely 
allegedly that some witnesses, possibly inebriated at the time of the murder, gave conflicting 
accounts of the event during the original trial, or that other witnesses' memories may have 
faded, is insufficient. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 564 (recognizing that if "particularized 
prejudice" occurred during normal period of appeal, no due process violation results since 
prejudice would have occurred even absent any subsequent delay in the appeal); Cousart v. 
Hammock, 745 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding any alleged due process violation 
harmless where despite "lengthy" delay in appeal, "transcript of previous testimony by any 
missing witnesses was available" and concluding that no prejudice necessarily results "from 
the use of transcript rather than live testimony"). Moreover, contrary to defendant's 
summary attacks on the allegedly "conflicting" evidence, see Br.Aplt. at 44, that evidence 
established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Statement of Facts. 
In sum, while the delay since defendant's conviction has been substantial, the 
appellate process has been constitutional. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for murder should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-2-402 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony 
defined. 
( D A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person 
as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified 
in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(a) initially provokes the use offeree against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission 
or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, 
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communi-
cates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the 
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful 
force; and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by them-
selves, constitute "combat by agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing rela-
tionship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal 
right to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened 
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully 
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated 
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and 
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, 
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and 
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony 
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to 
create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a 
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not 
constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time 
unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or 
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to 
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course 
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged in an ultimate fighting 
match as defined in Section 76-9-705. 
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Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence: 
(2) in prosecutions tor ottenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of am infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each 
party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors sire permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
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be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, 
except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession 
of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court 
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take 
notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. 
As necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
the jury on taking and using notes. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them 
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
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Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties 
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such 
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of 
the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a 
preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of tnal. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that alternate jurors be impan-
eled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors 
who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the 
same time and in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall 
be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, 
and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. 
An alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged 
when the jury retires to consider its verdict unless the parties stipulate 
otherwise and the court approves the stipulation. The court may withhold from 
the jurors the identity of the alternate jurors until the jurors begin delibera-
tions. If one or two alternate jurors are called each party is entitled to one 
peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to 
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. 
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge 
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms 
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The 
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party 
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under 
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular 
juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and 
amy other person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such 
challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the following 
grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same 
grounds. 
( D A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person 
competent as a juror. 
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(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to 
an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either 
party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or 
obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and 
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident 
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service 
charge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial 
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness 
therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or 
in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or 
citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reason-
ably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No 
person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the 
juror can and will act impartially and fairly. 
(g) Selection of jury. The judge shall determine the method of selecting the 
jury and notify the parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. 
The following methods for selection are not exclusive. 
(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of jurors 
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any 
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for 
cause that may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call 
jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for 
cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may 
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause 
outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, 
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be 
challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors 
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, 
for all peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause that 
may be granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in 
random order. The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during 
the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may and, at the 
request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the 
plaintiff, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, including any alternate jurors, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If alternate jurors 
have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by 
computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
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(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well 
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict 
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after impaneling the jury and 
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform the duties of 
a juror and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with 
the other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to 
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus 
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on 
any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during 
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the 
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they 
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless 
by order of the court, the officer having charge of them must not make or allow 
to be made any communication to them with respect to the action, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and the officer must not, before the 
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Exhibits taken by jury; notes. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury 
may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have 
been received as evidence in the cause, except exhibits that should not, in the 
opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual 
size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits 
upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes during the trial and to have 
those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall 
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using 
notes. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delibera-
tion, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or 
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may 
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into 
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice 
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated 
on the record. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from 
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While 
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to 
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause 
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The 
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court, 
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such 
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule 
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48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names 
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreperson; the verdict 
must be in writing, signed by the foreperson, and must be read by the clerk to 
the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party may 
require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking 
each juror if it is the juror's verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an 
insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out 
again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from 
the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it 
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Addendum B 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0URT2M AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, 
Defendant, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 921500702 
1. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
These jury instructions are given to assist you in your deliberations in this case. The 
order in which these instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance, 
and you should not single out any one and ignore the rest. Consider the instructions as a whole. 
These instructions are intended to be applicable to either gender. Any use of the male 
pronouns (he, him, his) should be read to include the appropriate female pronoun if needed. 
2. ROLE OF JUDGE AND JURY 
This is a criminal trial. In every criminal trial there is a disagreement about whether 
someone has committed a crime. You must decide that question in the case. 
case. 
My duty as judge requires me to instruct you concerning the law which applies to this 
It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
Your function is to decide the issues of fact presented by the charges in the Information 
and the defendant's plea of "not guilty" thereto. You should not be influenced by pity for the 
defendant or by prejudice against the defendant. The fact that an Information has been filed or 
that the defendant has been brought before the court to stand trial cannot be considered by you 
as any evidence of guilt. 
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as I state 
it to you. You are expected to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the evidence and 
applying the law applicable to this case to reach a just verdict, regardless of what the 
consequences of the verdict may be. 
3. RECESSES 
From time to time during the trial we will take recesses. During the recesses you are 
to be governed by the following admonition: 
"You are admonished that during this recess or any future break in the trial, you are not 
to discuss this case with anyone, or among yourselves, nor to form or express any opinion as 
to the innocence or guilt of the defendant(s) until the matter is submitted to you. You are not 
to attempt to learn anything about this case outside this courtroom or visit any location 
mentioned in the trial. Your are to avoid and disregard any media or other reports about the 
trial." 
I also ask that you have no conversations at all with the attorneys, the witnesses, or the 
defendant. Please do not discuss this case or the law in general with the bailiff, the clerks or 
any of the persons involved with the trial as it progresses. 
4. THE INFORMATION 
The Defendant has been charged with the commission of a crime in a formal document 
called an Information. In a moment the clerk will read the Information in this case to you. 
Bear in mind that this is only an allegation to which the defendant has plead "Not Guilty". You 
may not consider the filing of the Information or the defendant's not guilty plea as evidence. 
You will hear the evidence from the witness stand and through any exhibits admitted during the 
trial. 
(CLERK READS THE INFORMATION) 
5. EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must determine the facts from the 
evidence produced here in court. If any evidence shall be ordered by me to be stricken, you 
must disregard it entirely. 
No statement made by the attorneys should be regarded as evidence. However, if 
counsel for both parties stipulate or agree to any fact, you should regard that fact as being 
conclusively proven. 
6. OPINION OF THE JUDGE 
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact. You must decide such questions for 
yourselves from the evidence without regard to what you may believe I think about it. My 
opinion is immaterial. If any statement or ruling of mine seemed to indicate that I held an 
opinion of any fact, this was unintentional and you are instructed to disregard it. 
(OPENING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSE1) 
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7. CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE 
You should only consider evidence admitted by the court. You should not consider 
evidence which may be rejected, or speculate as to the reason for objections, or the court's 
ruling on them. 
Where there is conflict in the evidence, you should reconcile such conflict if you 
reasonably can. But, where the conflict cannot be reasonably reconciled, you still must finally 
determine from the evidence what the ultimate facts are. 
You are not bound to believe a witness unless that witness' testimony is reasonable in 
view of all the facts. You may believe one witness against many, or many witnesses against a 
few, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
8. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
In judging the credibility or believability of any witness, you should consider the witness' 
possible bias, possible interest in the result of the trial, and any possible motive the witness may 
have to testify in a particular way. You may consider the witness' demeanor on the witness 
stand, the reasonableness of the statements, opportunity to know, ability to understand and 
capacity to remember. You should also consider whether the witness gave self-contradicting 
testimony, or was contradicted by other evidence. From all this you should determine any 
witness' credibility, and what weight you should give the testimony. If you should believe that 
a witness has intentionally testified falsely as to any material fact, you may disregard all of that 
witness' testimony, or give it such weight as you think it is entitled. 
9. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence follows the defendant through the 
trial until and unless the prosecution has met this burden. 
(TESTIMONY FROM WITNESSES) 
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10. REASONABLE DOUBT 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether guilt is satisfactorily shown a defendant is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the state to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. A reasonable doubt means a doubt that is based upon reason and one that 
is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not one that is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding 
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and eliminates all reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable people would entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of evidence in the case. 
11. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT 
The defendant is a competent witness in this matter whose testimony should be given the 
same consideration as you give to any other witness. You may test the defendant's credibility 
or the weight of the defendant's testimony as you would that of any other witnesses as given to 
you heretofore in these instructions. 
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12. ACT AND INTENT 
In every crime there must be a joint operation of act and intent. The intent or intention 
is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense and the sound mind and discretion 
of the accused. 
A person is guilty of an offense when the conduct is prohibited by law and the actor 
engages in the conduct with some kind of criminal intent. That is to say the actor engages in 
the conduct intentionally,or knowingly with respect to each element of the offence as the defini-
tion of an offense requires. 
Those terms are defined for you as follows: 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally" or with intent, when it is the person's 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly" or with knowledge, when the person is aware 
that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13-A 
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of 
COUNT I: MURDER, a 1st Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended 
Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the elements listed in paragraph 1, below, and the 
elements listed in either paragraph 2, 3, or 4, below. 
1. That said act did occur on or about the 28th day of 
July, 1992, in Washington County, State of Utah, although the 
exact date is immaterial. 
2. That the Defendant did intentionally or knowingly cause 
the death of another, Larry Gilstrap, by use of a firearm; or 
3 That the Defendant, intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, Larry Gilstrap, did commit an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that caused the death of another, Larry 
Gilstrap, by use of a firearm; or 
4. That the Defendant, acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, did engage in 
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby caused the death of another, Larry Gilstrap, by use of a 
firearm. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
each and every one of the elements in paragraph 1 and any one or 
more of the elements in paragraph 2,or 3, or 4,each in the 
alternative, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. If, on 
the other hand, you are convinced of the truth of the elements in 
paragraph 1 and any one or more of the elements in paragraphs 2, 
3, or 4, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
Defendant guilty of the offense alleged. 
A fs*> 
INSTRUCTION NO. I 3** B 
In these Instructions, certain words and phrases are used 
which require definitions in order that you may properly understand 
the nature of the crime charged and in order that you may properly 
apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as 
you may find them from the evidence. These definitions are as 
follows: 
"Intent" means intention, design, resolve, a 
determination of the mind. 
"Intentionally" means a person acts intentionally with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
"Knowingly" means a person acts knowingly or with 
knowledge with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances and that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes 
speech. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates 
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
4 ' ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. / J~C 
You are instructed that it is no defense to the 
prosecution that the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual 
combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the 
duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon was used. A 
firearm is a dangerous weapon. 
M * \ * 
INSTRUCTION 
You are instructed that 
be a defense to a criminal charge 
the existence of the mental state 
offense. 
NO. A?-/! 
voluntary intoxication shall not 
unless such intoxication negates 
which is an element of the 
4 ^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1±E 
You are instructed that the Defendant is justified in using 
force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to defend himself against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent death or serious injury to himself, or 
to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
If you find that the Defendant Richard Frausto did reasonably 
believe that such force was necessary either to defend himself or to 
prevent the commission of a forcible felony then you must find the 
Defendant Richard Frausto not guilty. 
You are instructed that with respect to the burden of proof, if 
any evidence is produced by the State or the Defendant that raises 
the issue of self-defense, the State then has the burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense. 
You are instructed that the Defendant does not have a burden of 
proving that the killing was in self-defense. If the State fails to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in 
self-defense, the Defendant is entitled to an acquittal. 
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified in 
using force that would cause death or serious bodily injury 
against another shall be determined from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A forcible felony is defined as an offense including aggravated 
assault, aggravated murder, manslaughter, and any other felony 
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person 
so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily 
injury. 
A fV** 
14. TWO REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS 
If the evidence in this case is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of 
which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant, 
while the other points to innocence, it is your duty under the law to adopt the interpretation 
which will admit to the defendant's innocence and reject that which points to guilt. 
You will note that this rule applies only when both of the possible opposing conclusions 
appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should 
appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere 
to the reasonable conclusion and to reject the unreasonable. Bear in mind, however, that even 
if the reasonable deduction or conclusion points to the defendant's guilt, the entire proof must 
carry the convincing force required by law to support a verdict of guilty. 
(CLOSING ARGUMENTS) 
15. USE OF NOTES 
During this trial I have permitted you to take notes. Many Courts do not permit note-
taking by jurors„and a word of caution is in order. There is always a tendency to attach undue 
importance to matters which one has written down. Some testimony, not written down, takes 
on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. Therefore, you are 
instructed that your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you should not 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in 
evaluating the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence, and are by no means 
a complete outline of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your 
memory should be your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision 
in this case. 
16. CONDUCT OF JURORS 
Your verdict must express the individual opinion of each of you. It is rarely productive 
of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of opinion on 
the case or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one does that at 
the outset, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to recede from an an-
nounced position if shown that it is incorrect. When you have first reached a conclusion as to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you should not lightly change it merely because other 
jurors may disagree with you. Discuss your opinions with open minds and if you are satisfied 
that your first conclusion was wrong, then you may change it. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but rather, judges. 
17. JURY DELIBERATIONS 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of yourselves to act as foreperson 
to preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you all agree. The foreperson 
has no more power than any other juror. In this criminal case your verdict must be unanimous. 
Your verdict must be in writing and must be returned to the court. 
Forms of verdict have been prepared for your use in this case. Your foreperson will sign 
that verdict which correctly sets forth your decision. I will now read to you the verdict form. 
It is not necessary for anyone other than the foreperson to sign your verdict. When you 
have arrived at a verdict, notify the bailiff, by knocking on the door to the jury room, that you 
are ready to report to the court 
DATED this 18th day of December, 1992. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 
It is the law, as stated in Instruction No. 13-C, that dueling, mutual 
combat, or a consensual altercation shall be no defense to a criminal 
charge of Murder, if the accused employed a dangerous weapon in causing 
the death of another during a duel, mutual combat or consensual altercation. 
However, you are also instructed that in this case, you must consider whether 
or not the Defendant was justified in the use of deadly force under the law 
of self-defense as set forth in Instruction No. 13-E. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUKT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING RECORD 
Criminal No. 921500702 
Defendant's Motion to Supplement Record came on regularly 
for hearing before the court on July 13, 1994. Plaintiff was 
represented by W. Brent Langston, Deputy Washington County 
Attorney, and Defendant was represented by Floyd W Holm and Michael 
W. Park. Being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record on appeal in the 
above-entitled action be supplemented as follows: 
1. During the trial, an instruction was given to t^s 
jury, virtually in the language of Section 76-5-104 of the Utan 
2. After the jury had deliberated for some period cf 
time, a question was sent out to the Court as to the meaning of 
said instruction. 
3. After consultation with counsel, to the best of 
136: 
recollection cf counsel for Defendant, the Court sent back a reply 
that, essentially said the jurors should read the instruction and 
consider it in conjunction with all other instructions which had 
been given. 
4. Some time later, the jurors sent out another question 
concerning the same instruction. 
5. Again, counsel for the Defendant and for the State 
were called into the Courtfs chambers for consultation with the 
Court in order to formulate a reply. 
6. Counsel for Defendant was able to persuade the Court 
that a clarifying and supplemental instruction should be given to 
the jurors, to clarify in their minds the meaning of that 
instruction. 
7. During the second consultation while the attorney 
for the prosecution and counsel for Defendant were present with the 
Court, the Court spent some time doing additional research and 
ultimately designing a supplemental instruction clarifying the 
instruction in question. 
8. Said session was not transcribed, but upon explaining 
the meaning of the supplemental instruction, and over the 
prosecutor's objection, the Court informed counsel it would oall 
the jury back into session and read the new Instruction to the jury 
in open court. 
9. As counsel for Defendant was returning to the 
courtroom he was informed by the Court Clerk that the jury had a 
verdict. 
10. When the jury came back into Court, the supplemental 
1363 
instruction was not read to the j-rcrs and no metier, was -sie 
defense counsel to have the supplemental instruction read to * 
jury, but a verdict rendered instead. 
DATED this / 2 day of U L/^ , 1< 
BY THE COURT: 
.994. 
JAKI 
District Judge 
L 36-* 
therefore, stipulate that pursuant to rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
attached copy should now be incorporated into the appellate record and designated as 
R. 1362-1364. 
DATED this [_ day of February, 2002. 
to *? e 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
y 
^Brenda S. Whfteley 
Attorney for Defendant/Appella 
jstine F. Soltis 
jtant Attorney General 
ley for Plaintiff/Appellee 
ORDER 
Based on the stipulation of the parties and for good cause appearing, 
F!LED 
Utah Court oi >vcoeJ? 
FEB 2 0 2002 
Pauteto Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attached copy of Order Supplementing 
Record be substituted for the missing onginal and designated as R. 1362-64 of the 
appellate record. 
-0 DATED this ^ day of February, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
2 
Addendum E 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO 
CASE NUMBER 921500702 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-203 - MURDER 
1st Degree Felony Plea: August 12, 1992 Not Guilty 
Disposition: December 18, 1992 {Guilty - Jury} 
Charge 2 - 76-10-503 - POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: August 12, 1992 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PARTIES 
Defendant - RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO 
IVINS, UT 
Represented by: THOMAS A BLAKELY 
Represented by: BRENDA S WHITELEY 
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: TARA DUGAN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO 
Offense tracking number: 585758 
Date of Birth: June 30, 1954 
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Prosecuting Agency: WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 
Violation Date: July 28, 1992 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 1,078.00 
.Amount Paid: 1.078.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Trust Balance Due: 0.00 
Balance Payable: 0.00 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description: Reporter Fees 
Recipient: FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
Amount Due: 1,078.00 
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CASE NUMBER 921500702 State Felony 
Paid In: 1,078.00 
Paid Out: 1,078.00 
CASE NOTE 
COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 930357-CA (DISMISSED) 
PROCEEDINGS 
08-11-92 Information filed 
08-11 -92 Judge SHUMATE assigned. convert 
08-11-92 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover. julies 
08-11-92 Note: ARR scheduled for 8/19/92 at 9:00 A in room 
with JS julies 
08-11-92 Note: ** REFER TO HARD COPY - DELETED IN CIRCUIT COURT jbh 
08-12-92 Note: Fel Arraignment JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. julies 
08-12-92 Note: TAPE: 920414 COUNT: 1050 julies 
08-12-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MAC ARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTjulies 
08-12-92 Note: Deft is present julies 
08-12-92 Note: CUSTODY^ County Sheriff julies 
08-12-92 Note: Chrg: 76-5-203 Plea: Not Guilty julies 
08-12-92 Note: Chrg: 76-10-503 Finding: Dismissed julies 
08-12-92 Note: TO BE SET FOR 3-DAY JURY TRIAL IN 60-90 DAYS; REQUEST 
FOR julies 
08-12-92 Note: APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR GRANTED WITH INITIAL CAP OF 
52,000 julies 
08-12-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II julies 
08-12-92 Note: FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON COUNT II julies 
08-12-92 Note: FILED: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATOR julies 
08-12-92 Note: FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT ON ARRAIGNMENT julies 
08-19-92 Note Notice of Setting [ 3 day trial ] julies 
09-03-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO RELEASE EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM 
09-04-92 Note: FILED: ORDER RELEASING EXHIBIT 4 7- FIREARM taunah 
09-08-92 Note: FILED: MOTION TO REQUIRE BALLISTICS TESTING taunah 
09-09-92 Note: FILED: RECEIPT OF EXHIBIT 4 7- FIREARM (DEP PAM 
HUMPHREYS) taunah 
09-09-92 Note: FILED: ORDER REQUIRING BALLISTICS TESTING taunah 
10-06-92 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE taunah 
10-06-92 Note: FILED: MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR INVESTIGATOR 
taunah 
10-06-92 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (10-7-92) taunah 
10-07-92 Note: Continuance JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. taunah 
10-07-92 Note: TAPE: 920493 COUNT: 0272 taunah 
10-07-92 Note: Deft Present taunah 
10-07-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTtaunah 
10-07-92 Note: CUSTODY: County Sheriff taunah 
10-07-92 Note: COURT GRANTS DEF MOTION FOR CONT OF JURY TRIAL AND 
MOTION 
FOR taunah 
10-07-92 Note: S1000 ADDITIONAL FUNDS. MR LANGSTON CONCURS. JURY TRIAL 
TO taunah 
10-07-92 Note: BE RESCHEDULED FOR LATE NOV OR EARLY DEC taunah 
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10-19-92 Note: FILED: REPORTER'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
(08-10-92) gwynm 
10-22-92 Note: Notice of Setting [ 3 day trial ] julies 
10-22-92Note: (JURY TRIAL SET FOR 12/15 92, 12/17,92 & 12/18/92) julies 
12-07-92 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L. gwynm 
12-07-92 Note: TAPE: 920594 COUNT: 1199 gwynm 
12-07-92 Note: Deft Present gwynm 
12-07-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm 
12-07-92 Note: FILED 
12-07-92 Note: FILED 
12-07-92 Note: FILED 
NOTICE OF HEARING gwynm 
STIPULATED MOTION FOR COURT REPORTER gwyr 
ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER [JLS 12-09-92] gwynm 
12-07-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
12-09-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
12-09-92 Note: FILED: SUBPOENA AND RETURN OF SERVICE (7) 
12-09-92 Note: GRANT AREND 
12-09-92 Note: CONNIE FRAUSTO 
12-09-92 Note: DAVID ICE 
12-09-92 Note: DEBBIE HERN 
12-09-92 Note: MELANIE LEE AREND 
12-09-92 Note: TRISH ICE 
12-09-92 Note: KATHY SCHEAR 
12-09-92 Note: Heanng (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L. gwynm 
12-09-92 Note: TAPE: 920596 COUNT: 1576 gwynm 
12-09-92 Note: Deft Present gwynm 
12-09-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm 
12-09-92 Note: CUSTODY: County Sheriff gwynm 
12-14-92 Note- FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER slw 
12-14-92 Note: FILED: DEFENDANTS REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS juhes 
12-15-92 Note: JURY TRIAL: JAMES L SHUMATE taunah 
12-15-92 Note: ATP W BRENT LANGSTON ATD J MACARTHUR WRIGHT taunah 
12-16-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL taunah 
12-17-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL taunah 
12-18-92 Note: CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL taunah 
12-18-92 Note: JURY VERDICT: GUILTY AS CHARGED ON INFORMATION taunah 
12-18-92 Note: DEFENDANT WAIVED TIME FOR SENTENCING taunah 
12-18-92 Note: SENTENCE: 5 YEARS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. taunah 
12-18-92 Note: NO FINE IMPOSED. taunah 
12-18-92 Note: 1 YEAR CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON 
ENHANCEMENT) + taunah 
12-18-92 Note: 5 YEARS CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON 
ENHANCEMENT) taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FOR A TOTAL OF 11 YEARS TO LIFE. taunah 
12-18-92 Note: RESTITUTION ORDERED AMOUNT TO BE DOUBLED AFTER 
DETERM taunah 
12-18-92 Note: INATION BY COA taunah 
12-18-92 Note: DEFENDANT COMMITED TO CUSTODY OF SHERIFF FOR 
TRANSPOR taunah 
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12-18-92 Note: TO UTAH STATE PRISON taunah 
12-18-92 Note: Chrg: 76-5-203 Find: Guilty - Jury taunah 
12-18-92 Note. FILED: SUPPLEMENTAL'INSTRUCTION taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: MENU FOR JURORS (COURT EXHIBIT #3) taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: COURT EXHIBIT -1 taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: COURT EXHIBIT =2 taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: JURY INSTTUCTIONS taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: JURY VERDICT taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS taunah 
12-18-92 Note: FILED: SUBPOENA'S AND RETURN OF SERVICE 
12-18-92 Note: JOSHUA MICHAELS 
12-18-92 Note: TROY WILKINSON 
12-18-92 Note: WILLIAM LEE DORNEY 
12-18-92 Note: LEIGHANN REBER 
12-23-92 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
12-23-92 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L. gwynm 
12-23-92 Note: TAPE: 920588 COUNT: 0020 gwynm 
12-23-92 Note: Deft Present gwynm 
12-23-92 Note: ATD: WRIGHT, J MAC ARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm 
12-23-92 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections gwynm 
01-06-93 Note: FILED: JUDGMENT, RESTITUTION JUDGMENT, SENTENCE & 
COMMITMENT 
01-06-93 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
01-20-93 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL gwynm 
01-20-93 Note: FILED: REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT gwynm 
01-21-93 Note: FILED: ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT [JLS 01-21-93] gwynm 
01 -22-93 Note: FILED: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL gwynm 
01 -22-93 Note: * AMENDED NOTICE APPEAL FORWARDED TO UTAH SUPREME 
COURT gwynm 
01-26-93 Note: FILED: SUPREME COURT THIS DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL CASE 
#930034 gwynm 
01-28-93 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF TRANSFER FROM SUPREME COURT TO UTAH 
COURT gwynm 
01-28-93 Note: OF APPEALS FOR DISPOSITION gwynm 
02-10-93 Note: FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY AND APPEARANCE OF 
SUBSTITUTE 
02-10-93 Note: COUNSEL (MICHAEL MILLER) 
03-08-93 Note: FILED: REPORTERS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS (FOUR VOLUMES) jbh 
03-08-93 Note: FILED: REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT (12-23-92) jbh 
03-11 -93 Note: FILE SENT TO SUPREME COURT jbh 
06-03-93 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT (SENT TO COURT OF 
APPEALS) 
06-16-93 Note: FILED: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASE # 930357-CA gwynm 
10-08-93 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS gwynm 
05-03-94 Note: Notice of Setting taunah 
05-03-94 Note: *SET FOR HEARING PER JLS taunah 
05-09-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on May 25, 1994 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. slw 
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05-19-94 Note: FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER [JLS 05-18-94] gwynm 
05-25-94 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L vannaf 
05-25-94 Note: TAPE: 940265 COUNT: 0001 vannaf 
05-25-94 Note: ATD: Deft prose ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTvannaf 
05-25-94 Note: Deft Present and pro se vannaf 
05-31-94 Note: FILED 
06-01-94 Note: FILED 
06-06-94 Note: FILED 
EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE kathyh 
ORDER OF CONTINUANCE(JLS 5/31 /94) kathyh 
TRANSPORTATION ORDER (JLS 6-3-94) julies 
06-06-94 Hearing Indigent scheduled on June 08, 1994 at 08:54 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: Hearing (INDIGENCY HEARING): JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: TAPE: 940284 COUNT: 0040 gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: ATD: None Present ATP: LUDLOW, ERIC gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: Deft Present gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: THE ISSUE OF THE PRIOR PUBLIC DEFENDER IS MUTE. MR. 
LUDLOW gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: THE WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY IS ATTEMPTING TO 
RETAIN 
COUN- gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: SEL IN IRON COUNTY TO ASSIST THE DEFENDANT. gwynm 
06-08-94 Note: THE HEARING IS CONTINUED TO JUNE 15, 1994. gwynm 
06-14-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on June 15, 1994 at 01:29 PM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: TAPE: 940293 COUNT: 2260 gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm 
06-15-94 Note: Deft Present gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: MR. FLOYD HOLM IS RETAINED BY WASHINGTON COUNTY TO 
ASSIST gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS APPEAL AND HEARINGS. COUNSELS 
REQUIRE gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE PROCEEDING. THE HEARING IS 
RESCHEDL'L- gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: ED FOR JULY 13, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. ON MOTON TO 
SUPPLEMENT gwynm 
06-15-94 Note: THE RECORD. gwynm 
06-22-94 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (F 
HOLM)slw 
07-11-94 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on July 13, 1994 at 01:29 PM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. julies 
07-13-94 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L julies 
07-13-94 Note: TAPE: 940319 COUNT: 0624 julies 
07-13-94 Note: ATD: None Present ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTjulies 
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07-13-94 Note: Deft not present julies 
07-13-94 Note: MR LANGSTON INFORMS THE COURT THAT STIPULATION HAS BEEN 
julies 
07-13-94 Note: REACHED BETWEEN COUNSEL AS TO MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD; julies 
07-13-94 Note: COURT INSTRUCTS MR LANGSTON TO SUBMIT WRITTEN 
STIPULATION 
WHICH julies 
07-13-94 Note: HAS BEEN SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT julies 
10-14-94 Note: FILED: ORDER SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD) (JLS 10/12/94) mjm 
03-06-95 Note: **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD TO 
THE taunah 
03-06-95 Note: COURT OF APPEALS taunah 
03-09-95 Note: **FILE MAILED TO COURT OF APPEALS ON REQUEST (SUE)** 
taunah 
09-14-95 Note: FILED: COPY OF LETTER TO FLOYD W HOLM FROM UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS cms 
09-14-95 Note: RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE cms 
11-28-95 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT RE: DISMISSAL OF ATTORNEY 
FLOYD cms 
11-28-95 Note: HOLM *PER JLS, FILE cms 
12-28-95 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPY OF FILE cms 
01 -09-96 Note: *COPY OF DOCKET MAILED TO DEFENDANT cms 
01 -09-96 Note: *COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS cms 
01-12-96 Note: FILED: LETTER TO JUDGE SHUMATE FROM DEFENDANT RE: NEW 
COUNSEL cms 
01-12-96 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM DECISION [JLS 1-12-96] cms 
01-12-96 Note: (COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON MOTION - COURT OF 
.APPEALS) cms 
02-06-96 Note: FILED: ORDER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (MATTER IS 
TEMPORARILY cms 
02-06-96 Note: REMANDED TO FIFTH DISTRICT FOR EXPEDITED HEARING 
RE: cms 
02-06-96 Note: DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S ALLEGED CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST) cms 
02-06-96 Note: **COPIES OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE ORDER: 
cms 
02-06-96 Note: LETTER FROM RICHARD FRAUSTO TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
(2/2'96) cms 
02-06-96 Note: CROSS-MOTION FOR REMAND FOR HEARING ON COUNSEL cms 
02-06-96 Note: MOTION TO SUSPEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE cms 
02-06-96 Note: AFFIDAVIT OF FLOYD W HOLM cms 
02-07-96 {Hearing Plea Barga} scheduled on February 21, 1996 at 11:00 AM 
in Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. carolyns 
02-07-96 Note: Notice of Setting carolyns 
02-08-96 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (2/21/96) cms 
02-15-96 Note: FILED: ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION [JLS 2-15-96] cms 
02-15-96 Note: *FAXED TO FLOYD HOLM ON 2/16/96 cms 
02-15-96 Note: RECEIVED: "FAXED" COVER LETTER AND ORDER OF 
TRANSPORTATION cms 
02-21-96 Note: MINUTE ENTRY gwynm 
02-21-96 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES 
L gwynm 
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02-21-96 Note 
02-21-96 Note 
02-21-96 Note 
02-21-96 Note 
02-21-96 Note 
TAPE: 960072 COUNT: 11:11 gwynm 
ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENTgwynm 
Deft Present gwynm 
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections gwynm 
DUE TO CONFLICT MR. FLOYD W HOLM IS RELEASED FROM THE 
CASE & gwynm 
02-21 -96 Note: MR. THOMAS A BLAKELY IS APPOINTED TO REPESENT THE 
DEFENDANT. gwynm 
02-22-96 Note: FILED: ORDER [JLS 2-22-96] (FLOYD HOLM RELEASED AS 
COUNSEL AND cms 
02-22-96 Note: THOMAS BLAKELY APPOINTED) cms 
02-23-96 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (FLOYD W HOLM) 
cms 
02-26-96 Note: FILED: CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (PAGE 5 -
SUPPLEMENTAL cms 
02-26-96 Note: INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL AND COPIES OF ALL 
DOCUMENTS cms 
02-26-96 Note: LISTED) cms 
03-18-96 Note: Began tracking Appeal Review on 
06/30/96 cms 
06-13-96 Note: Appeal Review date changed to 
12/31/96 cms 
07-01-96 Note: FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS cms 
07-01-96 Note: Ended tracking of Appeal cms 
08-14-96 Note: FILED: REMITTITUR AND COPY OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT 
OF cms 
08-14-96 Note: APPEALS cms 
01-14-97 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPIES taunah 
01-14-97 Note: PER JLS: SEND COPY OF JUDGMEMNT AND COPY OF DOCKET TO 
DEFENDANT taunah 
04-17-97 Filed: Letter from defendant to Judge Shumate (per JLS file no 
action) merrianm 
09-02-97 Filed: Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel, 
Thomas A Blakely (per JLS just file - no further action) mernanm 
10-08-97 Filed: Letter from defendant regarding copy of order of 
dismissal (per JLS file - no action) merrianm 
10-20-97 Filed: Petition for a Court Order Granding Re-Sentencing merrian 
08-17-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for EVIDENTIARY HEARING evelynk 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynk 
Prosecutor: ERIN RILEY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 990236 Tape Count: 11:04-12:04 
HEARING 
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Following Habeas Corpus Petition (970501445). Court orders 
defendant resentenced nun pro tunc to accord him rights to 
appellate procedure. Appeal time to run when judgment, sentence, 
commitment nun pro tunc is signed. 
Ms Riley to prepare same with County Attorney. 
12-14-99 Filed: Notice of Review Hearing georgis 
12-14-99 Notice •• NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 882689 georgis 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 12/22/1999 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom D 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST GEORGE, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
12-14-99 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on December 22, 1999 at 01:30 PM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. georgis 
12-22-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing diannem 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Clerk: diannem 
Prosecutor: TARA DUGAN 
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 990405 Tape Count: 1:50 
HEARING 
This matter is heard in conjunction with civil case number 
970501445. Court orders Mr. Bowler to prepare a Remand Order in 
the civil case so that resentencing can be set for this matter. 
Mr. Bowler to have order prepared no later than 12/30/99. (1:53 en 
12-29-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 888018 merrianm 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/26/2000 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom D 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST GEORGE, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Sentencing reset per order in case 970501445 - Prosecutor to 
prepare Transportation Order 
12-29-99 SENTENCING scheduled on January 26, 2000 at 10:00 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. memanm 
01 -03-00 Filed: Notice of Sentencing merrianm 
01-07-00 Note: RECEIVED: Transportation Order evelynk 
01-10-00 Filed order: Transportation Order evelynk 
Judge jshumate 
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Signed January 10,2000 
01 -26-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING wendyc 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendyc 
Prosecutor: BRIAN FILTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 000032 Tape Count: 11:09 
CONTINUANCE 
The Defendant's counsel ODEAN BOWLER has made a motion for 
continuance of Sentencing. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
More time needed to look into a possible second writ. 
HEARING 
TAPE: 000032 COUNT: 11:09 
On record 
This matter is back on the calendar for sentencing, after having 
been remanded back, by the Supreme Court, after filing an appeal. 
There is possibly a second writ pending. 
This matter is continued to February 2, 2000 at 10:00 a.m. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Washington County 
Sheriff office. 
COUNT: 11:13 
Off record 
SENTENCING. 
Date: 02/02/2000 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom D 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST GEORGE. LT 84770 
Before Judge. JAMES L. SHUMATE 
01-26-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 02. 2000 at 1000 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. wendyc 
01 -26-00 SENTENCING Continued. denices 
02-02-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 09, 2000 at 10:00 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. denices 
02-02-00 Minute Entry - Sentencing continued denices 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: denices 
Prosecutor- ERIC LUDLOW 
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TARA DUGAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 00-0043 Tape Count: 11:14/11:16 
CONTINUANCE 
The Defendant's counsel ODEAN BOWLER has made a motion for 
continuance of Sentencing. 
The motion is granted. 
Counsel submits explanations to the Court and requests continuance 
to allow additional time for research on the matter before the 
Court's calendar today. State does not object. Case is continued 
for sentencing. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/09/2000 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom D 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
'ST GEORGE, UT 84770 
Before Judge- JAMES L. SHUMATE 
02-02-00 SENTENCING Continued. evelynk 
02-09-00 SENTENCING scheduled on February 10. 2000 at 01:30 PM in 
Araignment Courtroom. evelynk 
02-09-00 Minute Entry - Sentencing continued evelynk 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynk 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 000053 Tape Count: 10:56/10:58 
CONTINUANCE 
The Defendant's counsel Odean Bowler has made a motion for 
continuance of Sentencing. 
The motion is granted. 
Counsel approach. Continue to 2-10-00 at 1:30 to allow Mr Bowler 
time to meet with defendant. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/10/2000 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Araignment Courtroom 
Fifth District Court 
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220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 
02-09-00 SENTENCING Continued. 
02-10-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for RE-SENTENCING evelynk 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynk 
Prosecutor: PAUL CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): ODEAN BOWLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 000054 Tape Count: 1:39/148 
HEARING 
Matter before the Court for resentencing as a result of Habeas 
Corpus petition. Mr Bowler updates Court on status of appeal. 
Docket text incorrect regarding sentence. Court clarifies same. 
County Attorney to prepare a judgment that corrects said language. 
Defendant's materials ordered safeguarded and transported for 
defendant. Mr Bowler to prepare order. 
Defendant sentenced 5 - life and one year consecutive with an 
additional indeterminant term up to 6 years on the firearms 
enhancement. Credit given for time served nunc pro tunc. 
County Attorney to prepare order and forward to Mr Bowler for 
review before submitting to Court. 
Defendant informed of right to appeal. 
02-10-00 Note: RE-SENTENCING minutes modified. evelynk 
03-10-00 Filed: Letter from Defendant (per JLS, Call Odean Bowler to get 
his order submitted) wehdyc 
03-14-00 Note: **Called Mr. Bowler's office and left message to submit 
order.** wendyc 
03-29-00 Filed: Request for Copy of Tape (Tape *000054 Wash Co Atty) judymb 
04-12-00 Note: Request for Transcript of Trial RECD. Request referred 
to Paul McMullin for copying purposes. carolyns 
04-13-00 Note: Request for Copy of Preliminary Hearing Transcript RECD. 
Request referred to Paul McMullin for copying purposes. carolyns 
04-18-00 Filed: Promiose to Pay Cost of Transcript evelynk 
04-18-00 Filed: Transcript Request/Billing Statement evelynk 
04-18-00 Note: Copies of Transcripts received from Paul McMullin and 
forwarded to Mr. Bowler, requester. carolyns 
04-18-00 Trust Account created Total Due: 1078.00 carolyns 
04-24-00 Judgment #1 Entered wendyc 
Creditor: STATE OF UTAH 
Debtor: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO 
6,265.50 Total Judgment 
6,265.50 Judgment Grand Total 
04-24-00 Filed judgment: Judgment, Restitution Judgment, Sentence, 
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(Amended Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment wendyc 
Judge jshumate 
Signed April 20, 2000 
05-05-00 Note: RECEIVED: Judgment, Restitution Judgment evelynk 
05-08-00 Judgment #1 Modified evelynk 
Creditor: STATE OF UTAH 
Debtor: RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO 
6,265.50 Total Judgment 
6,265.50 Judgment Grand Total 
05-08-00 Filed order: Judgent, Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second 
Amended Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment evelynk 
Judge j shumate 
Signed May 08, 2000 
05-11-00 Reporter Fees Payment Received: 1,078.00 lailm 
Note: Mail Payment; 
05-22-00 Note: 
05-22-00 Note: Check #12198 payee changed to from susans 
05-22-00 Reporter Fees Check # 12198 Trust Payout: 1,078.00 susans 
06-05-00 Filed: Notice of Appeal wendyc 
06-06-00 Note: **Certified copy of notice of appeal sent to Appeals 
Court** wendyc 
06-21-00 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court to Odean Bowler (case 
#20005 20-SC) evelynk 
10-16-00 Filed: Order (matter transferred to Utah Court of Appeals) sharones 
10-19-00 Filed: Copy of Letter from Utah Court of Appeals, rexase is 
now in that office with the case #20000520-CA assigned, dated 
10/16/00 and addressed to Odean Bowler denices 
10-27-00 Note: *File Sent to Court of Appeals via UPS* evelynk 
12-12-00 Filed: Order from Utah Court of Appeals dated 12-8-00 sharones 
12-13-00 Notice - NOTICE for Case 921500702 ID 1058094 sharones 
STATUS OF COUNSEL is scheduled. 
Date: 01/17/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom D 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
220 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST GEORGE, UT 84770 
Before Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
12-13-00 STATUS OF COUNSEL scheduled on January 17, 2001 at 09:00 AM in 
Courtroom D with Judge SHUMATE. sharones 
12-13-00 Filed: Notice of Status of Counsel sharones 
01-17-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for STATUS OF COUNSEL evelynk 
Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynk 
Prosecutor: LUDLOW, ERIC A 
Defendant 
Video 
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Tape Number: 010018 Tape Count: 9:02/9:03 
HEARING 
Court authorizes telephone contact with Ms Whiteley. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints BRENDA S WHITELEY 
to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: BRENDA S WHITELEY 
Address: 150 North 200 East Suite 203 PO Box 160 
City: St George UT 84770 
Phone: 435-628-2884 
01-17-01 Filed: Substitution of Counsel sharones 
01-26-01 Note: SENT: 2ND SUPPLEMENTAL INDEX TO COURT OF APPEALS 
evelynk 
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